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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL 
ABSTRACT 
The objectives of this  report  are fourfold:  (i)  to  provide Members  of the European 
Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology of political contr:>l;  (ii) to 
identify,  analyse  and  describe  the  current  state  of the  art  of  the  most  salient 
developments; (iii) to  present members with an account of current trends,  both  in 
Europe  and  Worldwide;  and  (iv)  to  develop  policy  recommendations  covering 
regulatory strategies for their management and future control. 
The report contains seven substantive sections which cover respectively:-
(I)  The role and function of the technology of political control; 
(ii)  Recent  trends  and  innovations  (including  the  implications  of  globalisation, 
militarisation of police equipment, convergence of control  systems deployed 
worldwide and the implications of increasing technology and decision drift); 
{iii)  Developments in surveillance technology (including the emergence of new forms 
of local, national and international communications interceptions networks and 
the creation of  human recognition and tracking devices); 
(iv)  Innovations  in  crowd  control  weapons  (including  the  evolution  of  a  2nd. 
generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA). 
(v)  The emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst state prisons 
face  increasing  pressure  to  substitute  technology  for  staff  in  cost  cutting 
exercises  and  the  social  and  political  implications  of replacing  policies  of 
rehabilitation with strategies of human warehousing. 
(v)  The  use  of  science  and  technology  to  devise  new  efficient  mark-free 
interrogation and  torture technologies and their proliferation from the US  & 
Europe. 
(vi)  The implications of vertical and horizontal proliferation of this technology and the 
need for an adequate political response by the EU, to ensure it neither threatens 
civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants. 
The  report  makes  a  series  of policy·  recommendations  including  the  need  for 
appropriate codes of practice.  It ends  by proposing  specific areas where further 
research is needed to  make such regulatory controls effective. The report includes a 
comprehensive bibliographical survey of some of the most relevant literature. AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objectives of this report are fourfold  (i) to provide Members of the European Parliament with a 
guide to recent advances in the technology of political control;  (ii) to identify,  analyze and describe, 
the current state of the art of the most salient developments; (iii) to  present members with an account 
of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv) to develop policy recommendations covering·  · 
regulatory strategies for their management and future control. The report includes a large selection 
of illustrations to provide Members of Parliament with a good idea of the scope of current technology 
together  with  a  representative  flavour  of what  lies  on  the  horizon.  The  report  contains  seven 
substantive sections, which ca11  be summarised as follows:-
THE  ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 
This section takes into account the multi-functionality of much of this technology and its role in yielding 
an  extension of the  scope,  efficiency and growth of policing  power.  It  identifies the continuum of 
control which stretches from modem law enforcement to advanced state suppression, the difference 
being the level of democratic accountability in the manner in which such technologies are applied 
RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS 
Taking into account the problems of regulation anci control and the potential possessed by some of 
these technologies to undermine international human rights legislation, the section examines recent 
trends and innovations. This section covers the trend towards militarisation of the police technologies 
and  the  paramilitarisation of military technologies with  an  overall technological  and  decision drift 
towards worldwide convergence of nearly all the technologies of political control. Specific advances 
in area denial, identity recognition,  surveillance systems based on neural networks, discreet order 
vehides, new arrest and restraint methods and the emergence of so called 'less lethal weapons'  are 
presented. The section also looks at a darker side of technological development induding the rise of 
more  powerful  restraint,  torture,  killing  and  execution  technologies  and  the  role  of  privatised 
enterprises in promoting it. 
The EU is recommended to:  (i) develop appropriate structures of accountability to prevent undesirable 
innovations emerging  via  processes of technological creep  or decision  drift;  (ii}  ensure that the 
process of adopting new systems for use in internal social and political control is  transparent, open 
to appropriate political scrutiny and subject to democratic change should unwanted or unanticipated 
consequences emerge;  (iii}  prohibit,  or subject to stringent and democratic controls,  any class of 
technology  which  has  been  shown  in  the  past  to  be  excessively  injurious,  cruel,  inhumane  or 
indiscriminate in its effects. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 
This section addresses the rapid  and virtually unchecked proliferation of surveillance devices and 
capacity amongst both the private and public sectors. It discusses recent innovations which allow 
bugging, telephone monitoring, visual surveillance during night or day over large distances and the 
emergence of new forms of local, national and international communications interceptions networks 
and the creation of  human recognition and tracking devices. 
The EU  is recommended to subject all  surveillance technologies, operations and practices to:  (i) 
procedures ensuring democratic accountability;  (ii) proper codes of practice consistent with Data 
protection legislation to prevent malpractice or abuse; (iii) agreed criteria on what constitutes legitimate 
surveillance targets, and what does not, and how such surveillance data is stored, processed and 
shared. These controls should be more effectively targeted at malpractice or illegal tapping by private 
companies. and regulation further tightened to indude additional safeguards against  abuse as well 
as appropriate financial redress. The report discusses a massive telecommunications interceptions network operating  within Europe 
and targeting the telephone, fax and email messages of private citizens, politicians, trade unionists 
and  companies alike.  This  global  surveillance  machinery  (which  is  partially  controlled  by  foreign 
intelligence  agencies  from  outside  of Europe)  has  never been  subject  to  proper par1iamentary 
discussion on its role and function,  or the need for limits to be put on the scope and extent of its 
activities. This section suggests that that time has now arrived and proposes a series of measures 
to initiate this process of redaiming democratic accountability over such systems. It is suggested that 
all telephone interceptions by Member States should be subject to consistent criteria and procedures 
of  public  accountability  and  codes  of  practice.  These  should  equally  apply  to  devices  which 
automatically  create  profiles  of  telephone  calls  and  pattern  analysis  and  require  similar  legal 
requirements to those applied for telephone or fax interception. 
It is suggested that the rapid proliferation of CCTV systems in many Member States should be subject 
to a common and consistent set of codes of practice to ensure that such systems are used for the 
purpose for which they were authorised, that there is an effective assessment and audit of their use 
annually and an  adequate complaints system is  in  place to deal with any grievances by  ordinary 
people. The report recommends that such codes of practice anticipate technical change including the 
digital revolution which is  currently in  process,  and  ensure that each and  every such advance is 
subject to a formal assessment of both the expected as well as the possible unforseen implications. 
INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS 
This section addresses the evolution of new crowd control weapons, their legitimation, biomedical and 
political effects. It examines the specific introduction of new chemical, kinetic and electrical weapons, 
the level of accountability in the decision making and the political use of such technologies to disguise 
the level  of violence  being  deployed  by  state  security forces.  The research  used  to justify the 
introduction of such technologies as safe is reanalysed and found to be wanting. Areas covered in 
more depth include CS and OC gas sprays, rubber and plastic bullets, multi-purpose riot tanks, and 
the facility of such technologies to exact punishment, with the possibility that they may also bring about 
anti-state retaliatory aggression which can further destabilise political conflict. 
This section briefly analyses recent innovations in crowd control weapons (induding the evolution of 
a 2nd. generation of so called  'less~ethal weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA) and concludes that 
they are dubious weapons based on  dubious and  secret research.  The Commission  should  be 
requested to report to Par1iament on the existence of formal liaison arrangements between the EU and 
the USA to introduce such weapons for use in streets and prisons here. The EU is also recommended 
to (i) establish objective common criteria for assessing the bior.1edical effects of all so called less lethal 
weapons and ensure any future authorization is based on independent research; (ii) ensure that all 
research used to justify the deployment of any new crowd control weapon in the EU is published in 
the open scientific press and subject to independent scientific scrutiny, before any authorization is 
given to deploy. In the meantime the Par1iament is asked to reaffirm its current ban on plastic bullets 
and that all deployment of devices using peppergas (OC) be halted until such a time as independent 
European research on its risks has been undertaken and published. 
NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS 
This section reports on the emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst state prisons 
face increasing pressure to substitute technology for staff in cost cutting exercises.  It expresses 
concern about the social and political implications of replacing policies of rehabilitation with strategies 
of human warehousing and recommends common criteria for licensing all public and private prisons 
within the EU. At minimum this should cover operators responsibilities and prisoners rights in regard 
to rehabilitation requirements; UN Minimum Treatment of Prisoners rules banning the use of leg irons; 
the regulation and use of psychotropic drugs to control prisoners; the use of riot control, prisoner 
transport, restraint and extraction technologies. The report recommends a ban on (i) all automatic, 
mass, indiscriminate  prisoner punishment technologies using less lethal instruments such as chemical irritant or baton rounds;  (ii)  kill fencing and lethal area denial systems; and (iii) all use of electro-shock, 
stun and electric restraint technology until and unless independent medical evidence can prove that 
it safe and will not contribute to either deaths in custody or inhumane treatment. torture or other cruel 
and unusual punishments. 
INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES 
This  section  discusses  the  use  of  science  and  technology  to  devise  new  efficient  mark-free · 
interrogation and  torture technologies and their proliferation from the US  &  Europe.  Of particular 
concern is the use and abuse of electroshock devices and their proliferation.  It is recommended that 
the commercial sale of both training in counter terror operations and any equipment which might be · 
used in torture and execution, should be controlled by the criteria and measures outlined in the next 
section. 
REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION 
The implications for civil liberties and human rights of both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of 
this technology are literally awesome. There is a pressing need for an adequate political response by 
the EU, to ensure it neither threatens  civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants.  The 
European Council agreed in Luxembourg in 1991  and in Lisbon in 1992 a set of eight Common Criteria 
for Arms Exports which set out conditions which should govern all decisions relating to the issue of 
licences for the export of arms and ammunition, one condition of which was "the respect of human 
rights in the country of final destination." Other conditions also relate to the overall protection of human 
rights.  However these eight criteria  are not binding  on member states and there is  no  common 
interpretation on how they should be most effectively implemented. However, a code of conduct to 
achieve  such  an  agreement  was  drawn  up  and  endorsed  by  over  1  000  Non-Governmental 
Organizations based in the European Union. 
Whilst it is recognised that it is not the role of existing EU institutions to implement such measures as 
vetting and issuing of export licences, which are undertaken by national agencies of the EU Member 
States, it has been suggested by Amnesty International that the joint action procedure which was used 
to establish EU regulations on Export of Dual use equipment could be used to take such a code of 
practice further. 
Amnesty suggest that the EU  Member States should use the Joint Action procedures to draw up 
common lists of (I)  proscribed military,  security and police equipment and technology,  the sole or 
primary use of which is to contribute to human rights violations; (ii) sensitive types of military. security 
or police equipment and technology which has been shown in practice to be used for human rights 
violations;  and  (iii)  military,  security  and  police  units  and  forces  which  have  been  sufficiently 
responsible for human rights violations and to whom sens1tive goods and services should not be 
provided. The report makes recommendations to help facilitate this objective of denying repressive 
regimes access to advanced repression technologies made or supplied from Europe. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The report concludes by proposing a series of areas where new research is required including  (1' 
advanced area denial and less-lethal weapon systems; (ii) human identity recognition and tracking 
technologies; (iii) the deployment of 'dum-dum' ammunition within the EU; (iv) the constitutional issue~ 
raised  by  the  U.S.  National  Security  Agency's  access  and  facility  to  intercept  all  European 
telecommunications; (v) the social and political implications of further privatisation of the technologies 
of political control and (vi) the extent to which European based companies have been complicit in 
supplying equipment used for torture or other human rights violations and what new independent 
measures might be instituted to track such transfers. Acknowledgements 
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PROJECT No IISTOA/RSCH/LP/POLITCON.1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this report is to  explore the most recent developments in the technology 
of  political  control  and  the  major  consequences  associated  with  their  integration  into 
processes  and  strategies  of policing  and  internal  control.  A  brief  took  at  the  historical 
development of this concept is instructive. 
Twenty five years ago, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science warned that 
a new technology  of repression  was  being  spawned  in  an  effort to  contain the  conflict in 
Northern Ireland. (B.S.S.R.S.,  1972). In  1977, members of BSSRS took this concept further 
in  a  seminal  work,  the  Technology  of  Political  Control  (Ackroyd  et.  at.,  1977).  BSSRS 
analysed the role and function of this technology in terms of a new apparatus largely created 
as a result of research and development undertaken as part of Britain's colonial wars, (most 
recently  in  the  ongoing  Northern  Ireland  conflict),  and  whose  main  purpose  was quelling 
internal dissent. According to critical U.S. NGO research organisations of that period such as 
NARMIC  &  NACLA,  work  on  this technology  of political  control was further enhanced  by 
technical developments achieved by the United States' military industrial complex, largely as 
a result of the  extended  global military interests of the  U.S.,  and its deployment of highly 
technocratic counter-insurgency doctrines, particularly during the .Vietnam War.' 
Up until that period, shrewd commentators on technology and society such as Haabermas 
Ellul  (  1964) recognised the  potential risk of a specific loss of traditional freedoms and civil 
liberties associated with  broad technological advances in  the future,  such as surveillance. 
However,  BSSRS  was  the  first  group  of  scientists  and  technologists  to  identify  and 
characterise a whole class of technology whose principal designated function was to achieve 
social and political control. 
In Ackroyd et. al (1977), BSSRS. defined the technology of political control as "a new type 
of weaponry." "It is the product of the application of science and technology to the problem 
of neutralising the state's internal enemies.  It is mainly directed at civilian populations, and 
is not intended to kill (and only rarely does). It is aimed as much at hearts and minds as at 
bodies." For BSSRS,  ''This new weaponry ranges from means of monitoring internal dissent 
to devices for controlling demonstrations; from new techniques of interrogation to methods of 
prisoner control.  The  intended and actual effects of these new technological aids are both 
broader and more complex than the more lethal weaponry they complement." 
The  concept of technology has many and varied interpretations.  As emphasised in  the 
interim  report  (Omega  1996),  the  definition  adopted  for  the  purposes  of  this  work 
encompasses not just the 'hardware'- the tools, instruments, machines, appliances, weapons 
and gadgets (i.e. the apparatus of technical performance); but also the associated standard 
operating procedures,  routines,  skills,  techniques (the software); and  the related forms of 
rationalised human social organisations, arrangements, systems and networks {the liveware) 
of  any  programme  of  political  control?  In  other  words,  it  is  insufficient  to  describe 
developments in a purely technical sense, it is also necessary to consider these technologies 
as social and political factors.
3 
1 When first published  1n  1977,  'The  Technology of Political  Control' anticipated  that the 
deployment of these technologies in  Northern Ireland, which acted as a laboratory for the!r 
future development, would spread to  mainland Britain. For BSSRS, governments would no 
longer reach for the machine gun when threatened at home. It will have plastic bullets which 
kill only occasionally, depth interrogation which tortures without leaving physical scars. It usE·s 
electronics for telephone tapping and night surveillance; computers to build files on actual or 
potential dissidents. NARMIC also warned that this technology was not just reserved for low 
intensity  conflicts  overseas  but  would  return  to  be  used  to  quell  dissent  on  the 
homefront.(NARM!C, 1971) Little by little this has happened. 
There  have  been  quite  awesome  changes  in  the  technologies  available  to  states  for 
internal control since the first BSSRS publication, a quarter of a century ago.  So many new 
technologies have been  created  that specialist publications have emerged to  service  the 
burgeoning market.
4  In the limited space available here, it is not possible to describe all the 
many  new  technologies  which  have  been  developed.  However,  a  broad  selection  of 
illustrations have been incorporated (at the end of the report), to give MEPs a good idea of 
the scope of the current technology and a representative flavour of what lies on the horizon. 
An extensive bibliography has been provided for those Members of the European Parliament 
wishing to explore specific areas and implications in  more depth.
5 
For the purposes of this report and its focus on appraising subsequent developments in 
the  technology of political control,  it  is worth focussing on  the same areas of Technology 
covered by BSSRS, which have not already been the subject of recent STOA reports. Whilst 
the need to examine the critical role of Northern Ireland in the evolution of some of these 
technologies makes the overall assessment somewhat anglo-centric, every effort has been 
made to show evidence of the proliferation and impact of this technology in other European 
countries and worldwide by naming the actual companies and corporations involved in both 
manufacture and supply. 
Taking into account the  multi-functionality of much of this technology,  Section 2.  of this 
report explores its role and function and the continuum of control which stretches from modern 
law enforcement to  advanced  state  suppression.  With  specific reference  to  problems of 
regulation and control and the potential some of these technologies present for undermining 
international human rights  legislation,  Section 3.  provides a analysis of recent trends and 
innovations. Section 4. explores current developments In surveillance technology, from bugs 
and  wiretapping  to  new  global  systems  of  mass  .aupervision  and  telecommunications 
surveillance already approved by the European Union. Section 5.  discusses the political and 
biomedical implications of innovations in crowd control weapons including the prospect of a 
2nd. generation of paralysing and disabling technologies currently being developed by former 
US nuclear weapons laboratories, together with the secret arrangements to incorporate such 
technologies into EU  policing  practices and export markets.  Section 6.  is devoted to  the 
emergence of new prison control systems and the prospects of privatised multinational prison 
corporations  transforming  crime  control  into  industry.  Section  7.  presents  evidence  c-t 
Research & Development devoted to the creation of new interrogation, torture techniques & 
technologies which leave few marks and the growing role of EU member states and tlleir 
allies in creating export markets for supplying this equipment to tyrannical states. 
The report ends with an  examination of the whole question of future  regulation of the 
vertical & horizontal proliferation of this dual use technology, in the face of relatively weak 
2 democratic controls on its manufacture, deployment and export. Some of these technologies 
are highly sensitive politically and without proper regulation can threaten or undermine many 
of the  human rights enshrined in  international law,  such as the rights of assembly, privacy, 
due process, freedom of political and cultural expression and protection from torture, arbitrary 
arrest,  cruel  and  inhumane  punishments and  extra-judicial  execution.  Proper oversight  of 
developments in  political  control  technologies is  further complicated  by  the  phenomena of 
'bureaucratic capture' where senior officials control their ministers rather than the other way 
round. Politicians both at European and sovereign state level, whom citizens of the community 
have presumed will be monitoring any excesses or abuse of this  technolo~y on their behalf, 
are sometimes systematically denied the information they  require to  do that job.  Therefore 
possible areas of policy change are presented at the end of each section, which could bring 
much of this technology back within the reach of democratic control and accountability, as well 
as  suggesting some further areas of future research. 
2. THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 
Throughout the  Nineties,  many  governments  have  spent huge  sums  on  the  research, 
development, procurement and deployment of new technology for their police, para-military 
and internal security forces. 
6 The objective of this development work has been to increase and 
enhance  each  agency's  policing  capacities.  A  dominant  assumption  behind  this 
technocratisation of the policing process, is the belief that it has created both a faster policing 
response time and  a greater cost-effectiveness. The main aim  of all  this effort has been to 
save policing resources by either automating certain control, amplifying the rate of particular 
activities, or decreasing the number of officers required to perform them. 
7 
The  resultant  innovations  in  the  technology  of political  control  have  been  functionally 
designed to  yield  an  extension of the  scope,  efficiency and growth of policing  power.  The 
extent to  which this process can  be  judged to  be  a legitimate one depends both on  one's 
point of view and the level of secrecy and accountability built into the overall procurement and 
deployment procedures. There are essentially two opposing schools of thought. 
The first school of thought identifies developments in  policing technology with efficienc;y, 
cost-effectiveness and modernisation. This school believes that the police and internal security 
agencies  require  the  most  up  to  date  forms  of equipment to  fight  crime,  mob-rule  and 
terrorism. Sophisticated law enforcement is viewed as value free and state security agencies 
are considered to  be  in  the  best position to determine their operational requirements.  (See 
Applegate  1969),  New technologies aid  the police  by  ensuring  that messages are rapidly 
received  and  dealt  with,  personnel  are  freed  for  other  duties  and  overall  efficiency  is 
enhanced. Only those with something to hide need fear the enlarged data gathering capacities 
of police computers.  Modern riot technology  is  presented as  a much  preferred non-lethal 
alternative to the use of guns and the police should always be allowed to use 'minimum force· 
when dealing with actual or potential law breakers. Existing controls and regulations governing 
the  use  of  this  technology  are  considered  by  adherents  of  this  school  to  have  been 
adequately designed to  ensure that no misuse takes place. Advanced police technology  1s 
therefore understood in this context as an invaluable aid to upholding the freedoms cherished 
as inalienable rights by  citizens  living in  Western Liberal  democracies.  Its export to  other 
countries sharing the same economic and ideological views, is viewed as an opportunity to 
help modernise law enforcement and buttress mutual stability,  law and order. 
3 The  opposing  school  of thought  on  the  other  hand  views  poltce  technology  and  the 
associated 'policing revolution' quite differently (See Manwaring-White, 1983).  They beliey6' 
that innovations in  political control technology t1as  put powerful new tools at the disposal of 
states in  need of technical fixes for their most pressing and  intractable social  and  politic<::~l 
problems. It is at the point where authority fails that repression begins (Hoefnagels, 1977) ar-tc 
at  that  point  an  illegitimate  government will  use  more force  just to  keep  the  lid  on.(See 
Chart.1 a.) As the crisis deepens, further force is required and the role of technology in  such 
a situation is to act as a force amplifier. Once the shaded area is reached (Chart.1 b),  terror 
becomes the only government service. 
New  police  technologies  are  perceived  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in 
attempting sub-state conflict control. Such 'control' is viewed as more apparent than real, but 
serves the purpose of disguising the level of coercive repression being applied. This school 
of thought argues that once operationally deployed, these technologies exert a profound effect 
on  the character of policing.  Whether these changes are  symptom or cause of the ensuing 
change in  policing organisations,  a major premise of  this school of thought is that a range 
of unforseen 1mpacts are associated with the process of integrating these technologies into 
a society's social,  political and cultural control systems. 
The  full  implications of such developments may take time  to  assess but they  are  often 
more important and far reaching than the first order intended effects.  It is  argued that one 
impact of this process is the militarisation of the police and the para-militarisation of the army 
as their roles. equipment and procedures begin to overlap. This phenomena is seen as having 
far reaching consequences on the way that future episodes of sub-state violence is handled. 
and influencing whether those involved are reconciled, managed. repressed, 'lost' or efficiently 
destroyed. Police telematics and their use of databanks (the subject of an earlier STOA report 
in  this area) for example, facilitate prophylactic or pre-emptive policing as 'dataveillance' is 
harnessed to target certain strata or classes of people rather than resolve individual crimes. 
(E.g. the proposed introduction of the Eurodac system which will utilise biometric information 
to  control and restrict the entry of all Asylum seekers into Europe, building in the process a 
new technopolitics of exclusion).
8  New surveillance technology  can  exert a powerful 'chill 
effect' on  those who might wish to take a dissenting view and few will  risk exercising their 
right to democratic protest if the cost is punitive riot policing with equipment which may lead 
to permanent injury or loss of life.  As  highlighted in the interim report, the human response 
to  the  deployment of such  technologies may  be counter-intuitive and  render progressive 
deployments of newer more powerful systems either obsolete or dysfunctional. This possibility 
is discussed in greater detail below. 
Any evaluation of these opposing  schools of thought needs to identify common ground 
since few would doubt that there are fundamental changes taking place in the types of tactics 
techniques and technologies available to internal security agencies for policing purposes. Yet 
many questions remain unanswered, unconsidered or under-researched. Why for example 
did  such  a  transformation  in  the  technology  used  for socio-political  control  dramatically 
change  over the  last twenty five  years?  Is  there any  significance  in  the  fact that former 
communist regimes in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and continuing centralised economic 
systems such as China, are beginning to adopt such technologies? What are the reasons 
behind a global convergence of the technology of political control deployed in the North and 
South, the  East and West? What are the factors responsible for generating the adoption of 
such new policing technology - was it technology push or demand pull? What new tools for 
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Chart 1. Declining Legitimacy & Repressive State Violence policing lie on  the horizon and what are the dynamics behtnd the  process of innovation and 
the  need for a vast arsenal  of different kinds of technology rather than just a few? Are  thE> 
many ways this technology affects the  policing process fully  understood? Who controls the 
patterns of police technology procurement and what are the corporate influences? 
In  deciding between these schools of thought, we need to  determine the extent to which 
future innovation is about the maintenance of existing power relationships, rather than citizen 
protection.  In  other words,  the  extent to  which their deployment ensures that only  certain 
permitted ways of behaving are allowed to continue without interference. Since this technology 
provides a continuum of flexible responses or options,  perhaps the overriding factor is the 
extent to  which  its  development  and  deployment  is  subject to  democratic control.  Is  the 
process of regulation democratically accountable or are there more hidden processes at work? 
Do  these  technologies  proliferate,  if so  why  and  how and  what  are  the  most  important 
mechanisms or processes involved? 
Since  all  this  technology  represents  an  unequal  distribution  of  coercive  power,  it  is 
important for Members of the European Parliament to be satisfied that sufficient democratiC 
control  is  exercised  to  ensure  that  such  powers  are  not  abused  and  that  unwanted 
technological and  decision drift is  adequately checked.  Whilst the  Interim  Report (Omega, 
1996) provided a brief analysis of the role and function of specific dasses of political control 
technology,  what follows  is  an  analysis of the state  of the  art  in  c.ertain  key  areas of this 
technology  which the authors believe warrant further scrutiny. 
3.  RECENT TRENDS &  INNOVATIONS 
Since the 'Technology of Political Control' was first written (Ackroyd et al., 1977) there has 
been a profusion of technological innovations for police, paramilitary, intelligence and internal 
security forces.  Many  of these  are  simple  advances on  the  technologies available  in  the 
1970's. Others such as automatic telephone tapping, voice recognition and electronic tagging 
were not envisaged by the original BSSRS authors since they did not think that the computing 
power  needed  for  a  national  monitoring  system  was  feasible.  The  overall  drift  of  this 
technology is to increase the power and reliability of the policing process, either enhanctng 
the individual power of police operatives, replacing personnel with less expensive machines 
to  monitor activity or to  automate certain police monitoring,  detection and  communication 
facilities completely. A massive Police Industrial Complex has been spawned to service the 
needs of police, paramilitary and security forces, evidenced by the number of companies now 
active in the market.
9  An overall trend is towards globalisation of these technologies and  a 
drift to  increasing proliferation, without much regard to  local  conditions. 
One core trend has been towards a militarisation of the police and a paramilitarisation oi 
military forces in Europe. Often this begins via special units involved in crisis policing, such 
as the Special Weapons and Tactics Squads such as the Grenz Schutz Gruppe in Germany 
the Gendarmeries National in  France; the Carabinieri in Italy; and the Special Patrol Group 
in the UK or the federal police paramilitary teams in the United States (FBI,DEA & BATF) 
that adopt the same weaponry as their military counterparts. Then a growing percentage of 
ordinary police are trained in public order duties and tactics which incorporate some element 
of firearms training. The tactical training  is often a mirror image of the low intensity counter-
revolutionary warfare tactics adopted by the military (See Chart 2).  In Britain, where 10% of 
police on a revolving basis train according to a military style manual, 
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Chart 2. The Pattern of Revolution 'Public Order- Tactical Options' using batons, shields and colonial style military wedges (See 
Fig.1)  (Northam,  1988).  In  the US,  one  study  uncovered a pattern of former  and  reserve 
soldiers being intimately involved  in  police operations with  almost 46%  of trainees drawing 
expertise from  "police  officers with  special  operations  in  the  military."(Krasker &  Kapella, 
1997). 
In some European countries, that trend is reversed, e.g. last year, the Swiss government 
(Federal  Council  and  the  Military  Department)  made  plans  to  re-equip  the  Swiss  Army 
Ordungsdienst with  118 million  Swiss  Francs  of less-lethal  weapons for action within  the 
country in  times of crisis.  (These indude 12 tanks,  armoured vehicles, teargas,  rubber shot 
and handcuffs). The decision was made by decree preventing any discussion or intervention 
Their role will be to help police large scale demonstrations or riots and to  police frontiers to 
'prevent streams of refugees coming into Switzerland'. 
10 A disturbing case of police deploying 
riot  weapons  against  a  peaceful  festival  occurred  last  year  in  Zurich  on  1  May,  using 
watercannon laced with CN irritant and rubber bullets below the advised 20 metres threshold. 
shows the process of convergence well.
11 
Convergence is the  process whereby the  technology used by  police and the military for 
internal security operations converges towards being more or less indistinguishable. The term 
also describes the trend towards a universal adoption of similar types of technologies by most 
states  for  internal  security  and  policing.  Security  companies  now produce  weapons  and 
communications systems for both military and the police.(Fig.2). Such systems increasingly 
represent the muscle and the nervous system of public order squads. For example, according 
to BSSRS(1985), GCHQ's telephone interception network was used to track UK miners during 
the  1984-5 strike,  so  that when miner's cars were stopped, police knew who they were and 
punishment or dissuasion could be  targeted appropriately.(See Fig.3) 
3.1  Area  Denial replaces personnel  guarding  either areas or perimeters.  It  has involved 
deploying  technology  which  can  either create  punishment when  its  limits  are  infringed  or 
systems with built in intelligence which can both locate the point of infringement and activate 
a corrective response. 
12  Sophisticated varieties incorporate punishment mechanisms which 
vary  from  pain  induced  by  electroshock  to  kill  fences  and  fragmentation  mines.  Many 
European companies make electrified razor coil  stun fences eg Bollore, Cogny &  Santerne 
in  France;  Birmingham Barbed Tape,  Gallagher and Arrnbell,  in  UK;  Reinaet Electronics in 
the Nether1ands. Many South African companies remain in the market from the 'snake of f1re' 
days  e.g.  Eclair;  Grinaker;  Microfence. 
13  Nowadays,  the  South  African  Government  has 
introduced new regulations on the maximum voltage for stun fences and new criteria for not 
mixing barbed wire and stun capacities- if snagged a victim can't be repelled and continues 
receiving current. Europe needs to adopt best practice in this regard. It would also be usefu• 
if existing research justifying company claims for sub-lethality of stun fences should be made 
public. These systems are not cattle fences and the same criteria cannot be used. 
Neural networks with semi-intelligence are being introduced to  protect sensitive control 
zones.  Systems  produced  by  companies,  such  as  Productivity  Systems  in  France  and 
Cambridge Neurodynamics in the UK, can allow pattern recognition and an ability to learn. 
Neural systems will play an increasing role in sentinel duties as robot technology improves. 
Already prototypes known as insectoids are being evolved to cheaply replace personnel on 
routine guard duties that require 24 hours cover and can be programmed to track the fence 
and carry either lethal or sub-lethal weapons (Knoth, 1994). 
8 The Non-lethal Warfare programmes discussed in 5.6 below are also exploring area denial 
technology. For example, Defense Week reported (19/11/96) that Alliant Tech Systems (USA) 
is working on alternatives to anti-personnel land mines. One of these is a wire barrier system 
dispersed by the Volcano Mine System.  The company received a 1 0 month contract in early 
August [1996] from the Army Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center at 
Picatinny Arsenal,  New Jersey.  The company is still to decide what kind of wire to  use for 
the  canister-launched area-denial weapon system,  but the  general idea is that the Volcano 
system will shoot out thin wire with something like fish hooks along it in enough mass to cover 
a  soccer-field  sized  area.  "It's intended  to  snag.  It's  not going  to  kill  you"  said  marketing 
manager Tom  Bierman. 
3.2  Surveillance  Technologies are  one  of the  fastest  growing  areas  of the  technology  of 
political control and a key problem is how to deal with the torrent of information it yields. The 
term  covers  a  vast  range  of  products  and  devices  but  the  overall  trend  is  towards 
miniaturization,  more  precise  resolution  through  the  adoption  of  digital  teci1nology  and 
increasing automation so that ~he technology can be more effectively targeted. The technology 
also  parallels  political  shifts  in  targeting  so  that instead  of investigating  crime,  a reactive 
activity, the fastest growing trend is towards tracking certain strata, social classes and races 
of people living in  red-lined  areas before any crime is committed.  Such a form  of proactive 
policing is based on military models of gathering huge amounts of low grade intelligence. With 
new systems such as  Memex, it is possible to quickly build up a comprehensive picture of 
virtually anyone by gaining electronic access to all their records, cash transactions, cars held 
etc Such pre-emptive policing  means the  majority are  ignored  and  policing  resources are 
more  tightly focused  on  certain groups.  Such  powerful forms of artificial intelligence need 
continuous assessment. They have an important role to play in tracking criminals. The danger 
is  that their infrastructure  is  essentially  a  massive  machinery  of supervision  that  can  be 
retargeted fairly  quickly should the political context change. 
Automatic fingerprint readers are  now common place,  and  many  European companies 
make them,. (see Fig  5).  But any unique attribute of anatomy or personal style can be used 
to create a human identity recognition system. For example Cellmark Diagnostics(UK) can 
recognise genes; Mastiff Security Systems( UK) can recognise odour; Hagen Cy-Com(UK) and 
Eyedentify lnc.(USA) can recognise the pattern of capillaries at the back of the retina; whilst 
AEA Technology (UK) are capable of signature velification. Over 109 companies in  Europe 
are known to be supplying such biometric systems. DNA fingerprinting is now a reality and 
Britain has set up the first DNA databank, and is already carrying out mass dawn raids of ever 
1000 people at targeted suspects.
15  Plans are being drawn up by at least one political party 
to  DNA  profile  the  nation  from  birth.
16  The  leading  edge  companies  are  racing  towards 
developing face  recognition systems which they  see  as being able to revolutionise crime 
customs and intruder detection as well as service access control. Whilst fully reliable systems 
are perhaps five years off, prototype systems have been developed in France
17
,  Germany'
8 
the UK
19 and the USA
20
. 
Night vision technology developed as a result of the Vietnam war has now been adapted 
for police usage (See Fig.6). Particularly successful are heli-tele surveillance versions which 
allow cameras to track human heat signatures in total darkness. The art of bugging has been 
made  significantly  easier by  a  rapidly  advancing  technology  and  there  is  a  burgeoning 
European  market?
1  Many  systems  described  in  Section  4  (below},  do  not even  require 
physical entry into the home or office. For those who can secure access to their target room, 
9 there  is  a plethora  of  devices,  many  pre-pack.aged  to  fit  into  phones,  lOOK  liKe  G1ya1 cue 
packets or light fittings  and  some,  like  the  ever popular PK  805 and  PK  250,  that can  be 
tuned  into  from  a suitable  radio.  However,  the  next  generation  of covert  audio  bugs  are 
remotely  operated,  for  example  the  multi-room  monitoring  system  of Lorraine  Electron;-cs 
called DIAL (Direct Intelligent Access Listening) allows an operator to monitor several roorrs 
from  anywhere  in  the  world  without  effecting  an  illegal  entry.  Up  to  four  concealed 
microphones  are connected to the subscribers line and these can be remotely activated oy 
simply making a coded telephone call to the target building. Neural network bugs go one step 
further.  Built like a small cockroach,  as  soon as the lights go out they  can  crawl to  the best 
location for surveillance. 
22  In fact Japanese researchers have taken this idea one step further, 
controlling and manipulating real cockroaches by implanting microprocessors and electrodes 
in their bodies. The insects can be fitted with micro cameras and sensors to reach the places 
other bugs can't reachn Passive  Millimeter Wave  Imaging developed  by  the  US Millitech 
corporation can  scan  people from  up  to  12  feet  away  and  see  through  clothing  to  detect 
concealed  items  such  as  weapons,  packages  and  other  contraband.  Variations  of  this 
through-clothing  human  screening  under  development  (by  companies  such  as  the  US 
Raytheon  Co.),  include  systems  which  illuminate  an  individual  with  a  low-intensity 
electromagnetic pulse. A three side very-low X ray  system for human useage, in fixed sites 
such  as prisons,  is  being  developed by  Nicolet Imaging  Systems of San  Diego.  Electronic 
monitoring of offenders or 'tagging', where the subject wears an electronic bracelet which can 
detect if they have relocated from their home after certain hours etc, has entered into use in 
the 1990's after being developed to regulate prison populations in the USA (Schmidt, 1988). 
Satellite tracking of VIPs, vehides etc is now facilitated by the once military Global-Positioning 
System(GPS) which is now available for commercial uses. Vehicle recognition technologies 
are discussed in  Section 4 below. 
3.3 Data-veillance - The use of telematics by the police has revolutionised policing in the last 
decade and created the shift towards pre-emptive policing. It is properly the focus of an earlier 
STOA  report on  the  technology  of political  control.  Some of the  most recent  trends  are 
discussed in Section 4 below. A comprehensive analysis of how such equipment has led to 
widespread  abuse  of  civil  liberties  and  human  rights  has  been  published  by  Privacy 
International (1995) and indudes 100 pages of all the companies involved in  servicing the 
security requirements of the regimes mapped in  Fig.38. 
Using data profilers, torturing states have used these systems to compile death lists. For 
example, the Tadiran computer supplied to Guatemala and installed in the control c..enter of 
the national palace. According to a senior Guatemalan military official, "the complex contains 
an archive and a computer file on journalists, students, leaders, people on the left, politicians 
and so on." Meetings were held in the annex to select assassination victims. A US priest who 
fled the country after appearing on such a death list said, "They had printout lists at the border 
crossings and  at the  airport.  Once you got on  that - then its like bounty hunters.
24  Withm 
Europe systems, such as that produced by Hanequin, allow the automatic production of maps 
of who  phoned  whom  to  show  friendship  networks.  Other  companies  such  as  Memex 
described  above,  allow entire life  profiles of virtually  anyone in  a  state  having  an  offic1al 
existence. Photographs and  video material can be induded in the record and typically up to 
700 other databases can  be  hoovered at any  one  time,  to extend the  data profile  in  rea 
time
25
. Significant changes in the capacity of new surveillance systems can be anticipated witr 
the advent of new materials such as BuckminsterFullerene, which will lead to minaturisatior 
of systems by several orders of magnitude. 
26 
10 3.4-Discrete  Order Vehicles - Hundreds  of companies are  now manufacturing  police  and 
internal  security  vehicles  in  Europe. 
27  The  newer companies  entering  the  market for  law 
enforcement vehicles tend to manufacture for both military and police purposes (eg. armoured 
personnel carriers, patrol, riot control, mobile prison, perimeter patrol etc.) and configured to 
have a 'non-aggressive design'. In real terms this means that their external appearance rather 
than their operational characteristics are modified to give a non-threatening appearance. Such 
'discreet order vehicles' look benign - like ambulances, whilst retaining a retaliatory capacity, 
capable  of dispersing,  containing  or capturing  dissident  groups  or individuals.(See  Fig.7 
Savage,  1985).  Some  models  such  as  the  Amac  vehicle  and  more  recently  the  Talon 
incorporate repellant electrified panels as well as a weapons capacity such as water cannon. 
Such vehicles are frequently used to seal people into a dispersal zone where the riot squads 
are at work,  rather than chase them out. 
3.5 Less lethal Weapons- For reasons explained more fully in Section 5 (below), the essential 
role of new crowd control weapons and tactics is to  amplify the level of aggression tha: can 
be unleashed by an individual officer. Thus the same rationale lies behind the usa of the new 
US side handle batons, the use of horse,  riot shield charges using riot wedges and snatch 
squads and the new martial arts style  arrest techniques which entered  European policing 
training in  the mid 1980's.
28(see FigS).  The biggest growth area however, has been in what 
used to be called 'non-lethal weapons.' The fact that some of these weapons kill, blind, scalp 
and permanently maim led the authorities and manufacturers to act - they came up with  a 
new name - "less-lethal weapons" - i.e.  they  only  sometimes kill.  Again  a  PR  objective is 
catered for in  the names which sound as if the  security forces are using relative restraint. 
Whether it be in Belfast or Beijing, these technologies are converging around the same design 
types. (See Fig 8).  One of the authors of the Technology of Political Control (Ackroyd, 1977) 
Professor Jonathan Rosenhead, believed that the emergence of such technology in China 
vindicated their original thesis. That is,  after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese 
authorities needed weapons options which would not excite international criticism, particularly 
when some much lucrative foreign investment was entering the Tiger economies of the Pacific 
Rim.~  . 
As  described in  Section  5 below,  this area  has seen  prodigious innovation including a 
second  generation  of new weapon  types  being  produced  in  the  former  nuclear weapon 
laboratories of the US in conjunction with big business.
30 The Council for Science & Society 
explained the phenomenon in terms of technological and decision drift (CSS, 1978). BSSRS 
argued  that  such  processes  were  integral  to  any  attempt  to  apply  technical  fixes  - an 
alternative explanation is that the riot control arsenal is never complete. Much of a weapon's 
effect lies in creating a sense of uncertainty.
31  Even the insectoid appearance of riot squad 
members  is  part  of  the  threat  impact  despite  its  ostensible  purpose  of  personal 
protection.(See Fig  10). 
Individually these weapons are becoming more powerful, for example each new riot agent 
is more powerful than the one it replaces. Thus CS is nearly 20 times more powerful than the 
CN  it replaced; CR  is more than 30 times more powerful than CN  and the newest and most 
aggressively marketed agent OC, (See Fig.11 ), the most powerful of them all (Chart 3). Little 
notice has been taken of the professional hazard assessments of the most commonly used 
kinetic impact weapons  deployed  in  Europe  and  USA which  have  consequences in  the 
'dangerous or severe damage region'.  (See Chart 4). 
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Chemical  Name and  Code  Fonn  Melting  Effects 
Fonnula  Point  oc 
1-Chloroacetophenone  CN  White Solid  59  Burning sensation in the eyes. Heav7 now 
of tears. Stinging of moist skin. Blisters at 
Oc-CH2c• 
very heavy concentration. Salivation. 
II 
nausea and headaches. 
0 
2-Chlorobenzylldene  cs  White Solid  94  Strong lachrymation with Involuntary 
malonltrlle 
closing of the eyes. Burning sensation on 
moist skin, 2nd degree burns. Coughing 
(~CH  =CtCHl2 
and vomltting at higher concentrations. 
I  Dlbenz (b.f.)-1 ,4- CR  Pale Yellow  72  Very Intense skin pain particularly around 
oxazeplne  Solid  moist areas. Involuntary closing of eyes 
(XOX) 
resulting In temporary blindness which may 
Induce panic or hysteria . 
N::CH 
Oleoresin Capsicum  oc  Colourless  65  Uncontrollable coughing and gasping for 
breath. Eyes close Immediately. Loss of 
body motor control. Intense burning 
sensation on skin. Leads to Immediate 
Incapacitation. 
1) IC~  The mean Incapacitating dose.  The dose that will affect 50% of the test population. 
Chart 3 - The Main Chemical Riot Control Agents 
Relative  1Ct50  (mg min/m
3
) 
Power  (1) 
1  20 
5  3.6 
30  0.7 
Most powerful  N/A 
(exact figs 
unavailable) ... 
w 
Weapon (2)  Manufacturer  Country  Weight of  Range  Impact Energy I 
Projectile  Joules (1) 
L5A3 Plastic Bullet  Royal Ordnance  UK  135g  25-60m  150-210 
'Cross Cartridge'  Heckler and Koch  Germany  179g  up to 30m  above 125 
Flash Ball  Verney Carron  France  28g  12m  200 
Jelly Baton  Crown  Netherlands  N/A  N/A  265 
Aircartridge 
Bean Bag  MK Ballistics  USA  40g  10-30m  120 
'Cease and Desist'  Milstor Corp  USA  N/A  Less than 18m  130 
-~-- -
Impact Energy  Severity of Injury 
Under 20 Joules  Safe/low 
Between 40-122 Joules  Dangerous  I 
Over 122 Joules  Severe damage region 
-- --
Notes: 
1) Testing of  kinetic energy projectiles was carried out at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds In the USA In 1975 to assess their safety and the likelihood, and type, of 
Injuries that might result from their use (see Technical Report Number 24-75: Evaluation of the Physiological Effects of a Rubber Bullet, a Baseball and a Flying 
Baton, Wargovlch et al., US Army Land and Warfare Laboratory, ~eptember  1975.) The results showed that for kinetic energy projectiles at different energies 
the level of  Injury was as shown above. (J.Rosenhead, New Scientist, 16/12/76, pp672-74) 
2) Information taken from manufacturers product data, updated to modern measurement units where required. 
Chart 4. Comparative Impact Effects of Various Kinetic •Less Leth~l' Weapons 3.5 Lethal Weapons Police Forces in  Europe have acquired many of the weapons normally 
associated with the military i.e.  hand guns, rifles and submachine guns eg the Heckler & Koch 
MP5. Shotguns are increasingly favoured by police forces because their wide spread of shot 
enables a blast to  hit more than one target and  in  the  US,  shotguns are  standard issue for 
a wide  range  of tasks  including  anti-terrorist and  riot  control.  Indeed  many  shotguns  and 
holsters specially adapted for police use have appeared on the market. E.g those by  Ithaca. 
Mossberg, Remington, Sage International and Wilsor Arms.  Many of these are literally sawn 
off shotguns and their wider spread increases the number of likely targets. For example, the 
Witness shotgun has a barrel of only  12.5 inches.  Specialist shotgun ammunition enables 
some of these weapons to smash the cylinder block off a car or literally cut a human in  half. 
The shotgun 'bolo round' advert e.g.  claims"lt slices - it dices".  Shotgun ammunition leaves 
no evidence of what weapon was used to fire it.  Similarly caseless cartridges do not leave "a 
spent cartridge  signature" and  this  has  significant implications for associating a particular 
weapon with a specific crime.
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In  theory,  police  weapons  should  have  a  different  level  of  lethality  and  penetration 
compared with those used by the military.  In  urban settings there is always the risk of hitting 
passers-by and  if a round  has high  velocity  and  penetration,  it will  easily  pass through  an 
intended target and continue penetrating walls and go on  perhaps to kill innocents  beyond 
the observed fire zone.  To  obviate this problem,  manufacturers are increasingly producing 
hollow point, expanding, or 'dum-dum' ammunition for police and special forces use.(See Fig 
12).  Paradoxically, the Hague Declaration (IV,3) of 1989, which prohibited the use of hollow 
point or dum  dum  ammunition,  does not apply to  the  policing  of civil  conflicts.  Soft nosed 
ammunition which  mushroom  in  the  body,  cause far more  serious damage than  ordinary 
ammunition. Dum-dums would take an arm or a leg off, whereas ordinary ammunition would 
sail  through  leaving  a  relatively  clean  hole.(See  Fig.13).  Some  these  weapons  like 
Winchester's Black Talon or the  high explosive filled pre-fragmented Frag  12  (see  Fig.14) 
cause.horrific injuries and raise serious questions about due process and the right to  a fair 
trial since without immediate medical attention, a target would be effectively an extra-judicial 
execution.  Many companies are now producing these bullets in Europe.
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3.6 Execution technologies-The equipment illustrated in (Fig.16) are not just museum pieces. 
In  the  USA,  companies such  as  Leutcher Associates  Inc of Massachussetts supplies and 
services  American  gas  chambers,  as  well  as  designing,  supplying  and  installing  electric 
chairs, auto-injection systems and gallows. The Leutcher lethal injection system costs approx 
$30,000 and  is the cheapest system  the  company  sells.  Their electrocution  systems cost 
£35,000 and a gallows would cost approximately $85,000. More and more states are opting 
for  Leutcher's  $100,000  "execution  trailer''  which  comes complete  with  a  lethal  injection 
machine, a steel holding cell for an inmate, and separate areas for witnesses, chaplain, prison 
workers and medical personnel. .
34  Some companies in  Europe have in the past offered to 
supply  such  devices  as  gallows  (Michael  Huffey  Ltd,  UK)  or  tender  designs  for  the 
construction of  'Libyan Rehabilitation centre" complete with stainless steel execution bays. 
((Observer, 5/84). A fuller picture is unavailable, but what is known is that European designers 
are tendering for Middle Eastern prison building work with all the attendant requirements to 
cater for Islamic shari'a  laws and  requisite  punishments and  amputations.  Modem target 
acquisition aids such as laser sights, coupled with silenced weapons technology also make 
extra-judicial execution much easier (see fig.  16) or if the deed must be achieved in public, 
systems like 'syncrofire' (fig.16) take the guilt away from the execution squad by allowing the 
firemaster to  achieve it by  pushbutton.  Special forces are of course taught how to  achieve 
14 such executions (See Fig.17 and this is one of the areas of expertise transfer that needs to 
be  brought back within  democratic control.  (see  Section 8 below) 
3.1  RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Given the civil liberties implications associated with new technologies of political control, 
there is a pressing need to  avoid the risks of such technologies developing faster than any 
regulating legislation. Therefore the EU should develop appropriate structures of accountability 
to  prevent  undesirable  innovations  emerging  via  processes  of  technological  creep  or 
decision drift. 
(2)  In principle, the process of innovation of new systems for use in internal social and political 
control should be transparent, open to appropriate public scrutiny and be  subject to change 
should unwanted and  unanticipated consequences emerge. 
(3)  Any  cla~s of technology which has been shown  in  the past to  be excessively injurious, 
cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects,  should be subject to stringent and  democratic 
controls.  Therefore within  Europe:-
(a) No development or deployment of blinding laser weapons and ancillary devices for 
police and internal security purposes should be  permitted; 
(b)  No  deployment  of  'sub-lethal'  area  denial  mine  systems  such  as  the  Volcano 
(discussed above),  should be  allowed for law enforcement or correctional purposes; 
(c) Police personnel should not be routinely armed with 'dum-dum' bullets, use of which 
is banned in international armed conflicts. Further research should be commissioned 
by  the European Parliament to  clarify the legal situation particularly in  relation to the 
suggestion that such ammunition can bypass the legal process and effect extra-judicial 
execution. 
(d) Further measures should be  developed to regulate electrified 'stun' & 'kill' fences. 
Dual function fences with a kill function should not be permissable as their use violates 
the right to  life and the right to  a fair trial. 
4. DEVELOPMENTS IN  SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 
Surveillance technology can be  defined as devices or systems which can monitor, track 
and  assess  the  movements  of  individuals,  their property  and  other assets.  Much  of  this 
technology  is  used  to  track the  activities  of dissidents,  human  rights activists, journalists, 
student leaders, minorities, trade union leaders and political opponents. 
"Subtler and more far reaching means of invading Privacy have become available to the 
government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means 
far more effective  than  stretching  upon  the  rack,  to  obtain  disclosure  in  court of what  is 
whispered in  the closet." 
So  said  US  Supreme  Court  Justice  Louis  Bradeis,  way  back  in  1928.  Subsequent 
developments go far beyond anything which Bradeis could have dreamt of. New technologies 
15 which were originally conceived for the Defence and  Intelligence sectors, have after the cold 
war,  rapidly  spread  into  the  law enforcement and  private  sectors.  It  is  one  of  the  areas of 
technological advance, where outdated regulations have not kept pace with an  accelerating 
pattern of abuses.  Up  until the  1960's,  most surveillance was low-tech and  expensive since 
it  involved following  suspects around from  place to  place and  could  use  up  to  6 people in 
teams of two working 3 eight hour shifts. All  of the material and contacts gleaned had to  be 
typed  up  and  filed  away  with  little  prospect  of  rapidly  cross  checking.  Even  electronic 
surveillance  was  highly  labour intensive.  The  East  German  police  for example  employed 
500,000 secret informers, 10,000 of which were needed just to listen and tr:mscribe citizen's 
phone calls. 
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By  the  1980's, new forms of electronic surveillance were emerging many  of these were 
directed towards automation of communications interception.  This trend was fuelled  in  the 
U.S. in the 1990's by accelerated government funding at the end of the cold war, with defence 
and  intellig~nce  agencies  being  refocussed  with  new  missions  to  justify  their  budgets, 
transferring their technologies to certain law enforcement applications such as anti-drug and 
anti-terror operations.  In  1993, the  US  department of defence and  the  Justice department 
signed memoranda of understanding for "Operations Other Than War and Law Enforcement" 
to  facilitate  joint  development  and  sharing  of technology.  According  to  David  Banisar  of 
Privacy  International,  "To  counteract  reductions  in  military  contracts  which  began  in  the 
1980's, computer and electronics companies are expanding into new markets - at home and 
abroad- with equipment originally developed for the military. Companies such as E Systems, 
Electronic  Data  Systems  (founded  by  Robs  Perot  )  and  Texas  Instruments  are  selling 
advanced computer systems and surveillance equipment to state and local governments that 
use them for law enforcement, border control and Welfare administration."
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According to Bannisar, the simple need for increased bureaucratic efficiency -necessitated 
by  shrinking  budgets  has  been  a  powerful  imperative  for  improved  identification  and 
monitoring of individuals.  "Fingerprints,  10 cards,  data matching and other privacy invasive 
schemes  were  originally  tried  on  populations  with  little  political  power,  such  as  welfare 
recipients,  immigrants,  criminals  and  members  of  the  military,  and  then  applied  up  the 
socioeconomic ladder. One in place, the policies are difficult to remove and inevitably expand 
into more general use."
37 These technologies fit roughly into three broad categories, namely 
surveillance,  identification and  networking, and are often used in  conjunction as with video 
cameras and face recognition or biometrics and  ID cards.  For Banisar, "They facilitate mass 
and routine surveillance of large segments of the population without the need for warrants and 
formal  investigations.  What the  East German  secret police  could  only  dream  of  is  rapidly 
becoming a reality in the free world."
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4.1  Vehicte  Recognition Systems 
A  huge  range of surveillance technologies has evolved, including the night vision goggles 
discussed  in  3  above;  parabolic microphones  to  detect conversations  over  a  kilometre 
away(see Fig.18); laser versions marketed by the German company PK Electronic, can pick 
up  any  conversation from  a  closed  window in  line  of  sight;  the  Danish  Jai  stroboscopic 
camera (Fig.19) which can take hundreds of pictures in  a matter of seconds and individually 
photograph  all  the  participants  in  a  demonstration  or  March;  and  the  automatic  vehicle 
recognition systems which can identify a car number plate then track the car around a city 
using  a  computerised  geographic  information  system.(Fig.20)  Such  systems  are  now 
16 commercially available, for example,  the Talon  system  introduced in  1994 by  UK company 
Racal  at a price of £2000 per unit. The  system is trained to  recognise number plates based 
on  neural network technology developed by  Cambridge Neurodynamics,  and  can  see  both 
night and day.  Initially it has been used for traffic monitoring but its function has been adapted 
in recent years to cover security surveillance and has been incorporated in the "ring of steel" 
around London. The system can then record all the vehicles that entered or left the cordon 
on  a particular day. 
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Such  surveillance  systems  raise  significant  issues  of  accountability  particularly  when 
transferred to authoritarian regimes. The cameras in Fig  21  in Tiananmen Square were sold 
as  advanced traffic control  systems  by  Siemens  Plessey.  Yet after the  1989 massacre of 
students,  there  followed  a  witch  hunt  when  the  authorities  tortured  and  interrogated 
thousands in an effort to ferret out the subversives. The Scoot surveillance system with USA 
made Pelco camera were used to faithfully record the protests. the images were repeatedly 
broadcast over Chinese television offering a reward for information, with the result that nearly 
all  the  transgressors were  identified.  Again  democratic accountability  is  only  the  criterion 
which  distinguishes a  modern  traffic control  system  from  an  advanced  dissident capture 
technology.  Foreign companies are exporting traffic control systems to  Lhasa in Tibet, yet 
Lhasa does not as yet have any traffic control problems. The problem here may be a culpable 
lack of imagination.(Fig.22) Several European countries are manufacturing vehicle and people 
tracking technologies,  including France
40
,  Germany"
1
,  The Netherlands
42  and the UK
43
. 
4.2 CCTV Surveillance  Networ1c:s 
In fact the art of visual surveillance has dramatically changed over recent years. of course 
police and intelligence officers still photograph demonstrations and individuals of interest but 
increasingly  such  images can  be  stored  and  searched.  (Fig.  23)  The  revolution  in  urban 
surveillance will reach the next generation of control once reliable face recognition comes in. 
It  will  initially be  introduced at stationary  locations, like turnstiles, customs points,  security 
gateways ere.  to enable a standard full face recognition to take place. However, in the early 
part of the 21st. century, facial recognition on CCTV will be a reality and those countries with 
CCTV infrastructures will view such technology as a natural add-on. 
It  is  important  to  set  clear  guidelines  and  codes  of  practice  for  such  technological 
innovations, well in advance of the digital revolution making new and unforseen opportunities 
to collate, analyze, recognise and store such visual images. Such regulation will need to be 
founded on  sound data protection principles and take cognizance of article 15 of the 1995 
European  Directive  on  the  protection  of  Individuals and  Processing  of  Personal  Data.
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Essentially this says that : 
"Member States shall grant the right of every person not to be subject to a decision which 
produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely 
on  the  automatic processing of data." 
The  attitude  to  CCTV  camera  networks  varies  greatly  in  the  European  Union,  from  the 
position in Denmark where such cameras are banned by law to the position in the UK, where 
many hundreds of CCTV networks exist.  Nevertheless, a common position on the status of 
such systems where they exist in relation to data protection principles should apply in general. 
A specific consideration is the legal status of admissibility as evidence, of digital material such 
17 as  those  taken  by  the  more  advanced  CCTV  systems.  Much  of  this  will  fall  within  data 
protection legislation if the material gathered can be searched eg by  car number plate or by 
time.  Given that material from  such systems can  be seemlessly edited, the European Data 
Protection  Directive legislation needs to  be  implemented through primary legislation which 
clarifies the law as it applies to CCTV, to avoid confusion amongst both CCTV data controllers· 
as well  as citizens as  data subjects.  Primary legislation will  make it  possible to  extend  thE' 
impact of the Directive to areas of activity that do not fall within community law. Articles 3 and 
13  of  the  Directive  should  not  create  a  blanket  covering  the  use  of  CCTV  in  every 
circumstance in  a domestic context. 
A  proper  code  of  practice  should  cover  the  use  of  all  CCTV  surveillance  schemes 
operating in  public spaces and especially in  residential area.  The Code of Practice should 
encompass:- a)  a  purpose  statement  covering  the  key  objectives  of the  scheme;  b)  a 
consideration of the  extent to  which the  scheme falls within the  scope of Data  Protection 
legislation; c) the responsibilities of the owner of the scheme and those of local partners; d) 
the  way  the  scheme  is  to  be  effectively  managed  and  installed;  e)  the  principles  of 
accountability; f) the availability of public information on the scheme and the principles of its 
operation in  residential areas; g) the formal approaches to be used to assess, evaluate and 
audit  the  performance  of both  the  scheme  and  the  accompanying  Code  of  Practice;  h) 
mechanisms for dealing with complaints and any breaches of the  Code including those of 
security;  i)  detailing  the  extent of any  police  contacts  or  use  of the  scheme;  and  j)  the 
procedures for democratically dealing with proposals of technological change. 
Given that the United Kingdom has one of the most advanced CCTV network coverage 
in  Europe and that the issues of regulation and control have been perhaps more developed 
that elsewhere, it is suggested that the Civi! liberties Committee formally consider the· model 
Code of Practice for CCTV produced by the Local Government Information Unit (LGIU, 1996) 
in  London  (A  Watching  Brief)  at  a  future  meeting  of  this  committee,  with  a  view  to 
recommending it for adoption throughout the EU. 
4.3 Bugging & Tapping Devices 
A wide range of bugging and tapping devices have been evolved to record conversations 
and  to  intercept telecommunications traffic.  (See Fig.  24)  In  recent years the widespread 
practice of illegal and legal interception of communications and the planting of 'bugs' has been 
an  issue  in  many  European  states.  For  example,  Italy,  France,  Sweden,
45  Belgium,
46 
Germany,
47 Norway,
48 the Netherlands
41 and the U.K
50
.  The level and scale of some of these 
illegal activities is astonishing. For example, a court meeting on 30 September 1996 was told 
that the Presidential Palace's anti-terrorist unit was tapping six former Mitterand administration 
officials,  including  ex-cabinet  chief  Giles  Manage. 
51  An  official  panel,  the  independent 
Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions, said that 100,000 telephone lines are 
illegally tapped each year  in  France and that state agencies may be behind much of the 
eavesdropping. They found that curbs imposed by official bodies may have tempted them to 
farm out  their illegal bugging to  private firms. 
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However, planting illegal bugs like the one shown in  (Fig 24) is yesterday's technology. 
Modem snoopers can by specially adapted lap top computers like that shown in (Fig.24), and 
simply tune in to all the mobile phones active in the area by cursoring down to their number. 
The machine will even search for numbers 'of interest' to  see if they  are active.  However, 
18 these bugs and taps pale into insignificance next to  the  national and international state run 
interceptions networks. 
4.4 National & International Communications Interceptions Networks 
Modern communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced interceptions 
equipment which can be used to listen in.  Some systems even lend themselves to a dual role 
as  a national interceptions network.  For example the  message  switching  system  used  on 
digital exchanges like System X in  the  UK supports an  Integrated Services Digital Network 
(ISDN) Protocol. This allows digital devices, e.g. fax to  share the system with existing lines. 
The  ISDN  subset is  defined  in  their documents as  "Signalling  CCITI1-series interface for 
ISDN access. What is not widely known is that built in to the international CCITI protocol is 
the ability to  take phones 'off hook' and  listen into conversations occurring near the phone, 
without the user being aware that it is happening. (SGR Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively 
means that a national dial up telephone tapping capacity is built into these systems from the 
start.  (System  X  has  been  exported  to  Russia  &  China)  Similarly,  the  digital  technoi~Jgy 
required to pinpoint mobile phone users for incoming calls, means that all mobile phone users 
in a country when activated, are mini-tracking devices, giving their owners whereabouts at any 
time  and  stored  in  the  company's computer for up  to  two  years.  Coupled with  System  X 
technology, this is a custom  built mobile track, tail and tap system par excellence.(Sunday 
telegraph,2.2. 97). 
Within Europe, all email, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by 
the  United  States  National  Security  Agency,  transferring  all  target  information  from  the 
European  mainland  via  the  strategic  hub  of  London  then  by  Satellite  to  Fort  Meade  in 
Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The system 
was first uncovered in the 1970's by a group of researchers in the UK (Campbell, 1981). The 
researchers  used  open  sources  but  were  subsequently  arrested  under  Britain's  Official 
Secrets legislation. The  'ABC' trial that followed was a critical turning point in  researcher's 
understanding both of the technology of political control and how it might be challenged by 
research on  open  sources.(See Aubrey,1981  & Hooper 1987) Other work on what is now 
known as Signals intelligence was undertaken by researchers such as James Bamford, which 
uncovered  a  billion  dollar world  wide  interceptions network,  which  he  nicknamed  'Puzzle 
Palace.  A  recent  work  by  Nicky  Hager,  Secret  Power,  (Hager, 1996)  provides  the  most 
comprehensive details todate of a project known as ECHELON. Hager interviewed more than 
50 people concerned with intelligence to document a global surveillance system that stretches 
around the world to form a targeting system on all of the key lntelsat satellites used to convey 
most of the world's satellite phone calls, internet, email, faxes and telexes. These  sites are 
based at Sugar grove and Yakima, in the USA, at Waihopai in New Zealand, at Geraldton in 
Australia, Hong Kong, and Morwenstow in  the UK. 
The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many of the electronic spy 
systems  developed during the cold war,  ECHELON is designed for primarily non-military 
targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every country. The ECHELON 
system works by  indiscriminately intercepting very large  quantities of communications and 
then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like Memex. to find key 
words.  Five nations share the results with the US as the senior partner  under the UKUSA 
agreement of 1948,  Britain,  Canada,  New Zealand and Australia  are very  much acting as 
subordinate information servicers. 
19 Each  of the  five  centres  supply  "dictionaries"  to  the  other four  of  keywords,  Phrases, 
people and  places to  "tag" and  the tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting. 
country. Whilst there is much information gathered about potential terrorists, there is a lot of. 
economic intelligence,  notably  intensive monitoring  of all  the  countries  participating  in  the 
GA n  negotiations. But Hager found that by far the main priorities of this system continued 
to be military and political intelligence applicable to their wider interests. Hager quotes from 
a"highly placed intelligence operatives" who spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel  we 
can  no  longer remain  silent  regarding  that which  we  regard  to  be  gross malpractice  and 
negligence within the establishment in which we  operate." They gave as examples.  GCHQ 
interception of three charities, including Amnesty International and Christian Aid. "At any time 
GCHQ is able to  home in  on their communications for a routine target request," the  GCHQ 
source said.  In  the case of phone taps the  procedure is  known  as  Mantis.  With telexes its 
called  Mayfly.  By  keying  in  a  code  relating  to  third  world  aid,  the  source  was  able  to 
demonstratt:J telex ''fixes" on  the three organisations.  With  no system of accountability, it is 
difficult to discover what criteria determine who is not a target. 
In  February,  The  UK based  research  publication  Statewatch  reported that the  EU  had 
secretly agreed to set up an international telephone tapping network via a secret  network of 
committees established under the "third pillar'' of the Mastricht Treaty covering co-operation 
on  law and order.  \key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding, 
signed by  EU  states in  1995.(ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.95) which remains classified. 
According to  a Guardian report (25.2.97) it reflects concern  among European Intelligence 
agencies that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications. "EU 
countries it  says,  should agree  on  "international  interception standards set at  a level  that 
would ensure encoding or scrambled words can be broken down by government agencies." 
Official reports say  that the  EU  governments agreed to co-operate closely with  the  FBI  in 
Washington. Yet earlier minutes of these meetings suggest that the original initiative came 
from Washington. According to Statewatch, network and service providers in the EU will be 
obliged to  install "tappable" systems and  to  place  under surveillance any  person  or group 
when  served  with  an  interception  order.  These  plans  have  never been  referred  to  any 
European government for scrutiny, nor one suspects to the Civil Liberties Committee of the 
European Parliament, despite the clear civil liberties issues raised by such an unaccountable 
system.  We are told that the USA,  Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong Kong are ready to 
sign  up.AII these bar Norway are  parties to the  ECHELON  system  and  it is  impossible to 
determine if there are not other agendas at work here. Nothing is said about finance of this 
system but a report produced by  the German government estimates that the mobile phone 
part of the package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks. 
Statewatch concludes that "It is the interface of the ECHELON system  and its potential 
development on phone calls combined with the standardisation of "tappable communications 
centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and the USA which presents a truly global 
threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls."(Press release 25.2.97) 
Clearly, there needs to be a wide ranging debate on the significance of these proposals 
before  further  any  further  political  or  financial  commitments  are  made.  The  following 
recommendations have that objective in  mind. 
20 4.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
(i) All surveillance technologies, operations and practices should be subject to procedures to 
ensure democratic accountability  and  there should  be  proper codes of practice to  ensure 
redress if malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit criteria should be agreed for deciding who 
should be targeted for surveillance and who should not, how such data is stored, processed 
and shared. Such criteria and associated codes of practice should be made publicly available. 
(ii)  All  requisite  codes  of  practice  should  ensure  that  new  surveillance  technologies  are 
brought within the appropriate data protection legislation. 
(iii)  Given that data from  most digital monitoring  systems can  be  seemlessly edited,  new 
guidance  should  be  provided  on  what  constitutes  admissible  evidence.  This  concern  is 
particularly relevant to automatic identification systems which will need to take cognizance of 
the provisions of Article 15, of the 1995 European Directive on the Protection of Individuals 
and  Processing of Personal Data. 
(iv) Regulations should be developed covering the provision of electronic bugging and tapping 
devices to private citizens and companies, so that their sale is governed by legal permission 
rather than self regulation. 
(v) Use of  telephone interception by Member states should be subject to procedures of public 
accountability  referred  to  in  (i)  above.  Before  any  telephone  interception  takes  place  a 
warrant should  be  obtained  in  a manner prescribed  by  the  relevant parliament.  In  most 
cases,  law enforcement agencies will not be permitted  to self-authorise  interception except 
in  the  most  unusual  of circumstances  which  should  be  reported  back to  the  authorising 
authority at the earliest opportunity. 
(vi) Annual statistics on interception should be reported to each member states' parliament. 
These statistics should provide comprehensive details of the actual number of communication 
devices intercepted and data should be not be aggregated. (This is to avoid the statistics only 
identifying the number of warrants, issued whereas organisations under surveillance may have 
many hundreds of members,  all  of whose phones may be subject to interception). 
(vii) Technologies facilitating the automatic profiling and pattern analysis of telephone calls 
to establish friendship and contact networks should be subject to the same legal requirements 
as those for telephone interception and reported to the relevant member state parliament. 
(viii) The  European  Parliament should reject proposals from  the  United States for making 
private  messages  via  the  global  communications  network  (Internet)  accessible  to  US 
Intelligence Agencies. Nor should the Parliament agree to new expensive encryption controls 
without a wide ranging debate within the  EU  on  the implications of such measures. These 
encompass the  civil  and  human  rights of European citizens and  the  commercial  rights of 
companies  to  operate  within  the  law,  without  unwarranted  surveillance  by  intelligence 
agencies operating in conjunction with multinational competitors. 
(ix) The Committee should commission a more detailed report on the constitutional issues 
raised  by  the  National  Security  Agency  (NSA)  facility  to  intercept  all  European 
telecommunications  and  the  impact  this  supervisory  capacity  has  on  a)  any  existing 
21 constitutional safeguards protecting individuals or organisations from invasion of privacy such 
as those extant for example in Germany,  b) the oolitical, cultural and economic autonomy of 
European member states.  This report should also cover the social and political implications. 
of the EU/FBI proposals made to operate a global telecommunications surveillance network . 
as  discussed  above.  This  report  should  also  analyze  the  financial  and  constitutional 
implications of the proposals and  provide an  update of the work undertaken so far and the 
status of political approval. 
(x)  Relevant committees of the European Parliament considering proposals for technologies 
which  have  civil  liberties  implications for  example  the  Telecommunications  Committee  in 
regard to surveillance, should be required to forward all relevant policy proposals and reports 
to the Civil Liberties Committee for their observations in  advance of any political or financial 
decisions on  deployment being taken. 
(xi) All  CCTV surveillance schemes operating in  public spaces and especially in residential 
areas should be governed by  a comprehensive Code of Practice which encompasses:- a)  a 
purpose statement covering the key objectives of the scheme; b) a consideration of the extent 
to which the scheme falls within the scope of Data Protection legislation; c) the responsibilities 
of the  owner of the  scheme  and  those  of local  partners;  d)  the  way the  scheme  is  to  be 
effectively managed and installed; e) the principles of accountability; f) the availability of public 
information on the scheme and the principles of its operation in residential areas; g) the formal 
approaches to  be  used to assess, evaluate and audit the performance of both the  scheme 
and the accompanying Code of Practice; h) mechanisms for dealing with complaints and any 
breaches of the Code including those of security; i) detailing the extent of any police contacts 
or use  of the  scheme;  and  j)  the  procedures for democratically  dealing with  proposals of 
technological  change.  It is  suggested that the  Civil  Liberties  Committee formally  consider 
adopting  the  model  Code  of  Practice  for  CCTV,  produced  by  the  Local  Government 
Information Unit (LGIU) in  London (A Watching Brief,  1996). 
5.  INNOVATIONS IN  CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS 
The original development of riot weapons goes back to  Paris before the first World War, 
where the police began chemical crowd control using bombs filled with ethyl bromoacetate, 
an  early form  of teargas. The  British colonies proved to  be  the forcing ground for the wide 
range of chemical and kinetic impact weapons which followed. The irritant CS for example 
was first used in Cyprus in 1956, and between 1960 and 1965, CN and CS were used on  124 
occasions in the colonies. (Ackroyd et al, 1977).The growing demands of counter-insurgency 
and  urban warfare generated a first generation of new riot weapons serviced by  a growing 
police industrial complex. 
Thus plastic and rubber bullets were products of British colonial experience in Hong Kong 
where the flying wooden teak baton round became the template for future kinetic weapons. 
The concept was one of a flying truncheon which could disperse a crowd without using small 
arms. They were however regarded as too dangerous for use on white people, so  in 1969, 
Porton  Down came  up with  a 'safer'  version for use  in  Northern  Ireland in  1970.  Just as 
plastic bullets were considered far too dangerous for use in mainland Britain until 1985 when 
they proliferated throughout the UK's police forces,so were wooden baton rounds regarded 
as too dangerous for the residents of Northern Ireland but not Hong Kong. Now plastic bullets 
have been  deployed in virtually every continent from the USA to Argentina, from South Africa 
22 to  Israel and  China.  Obviously, the  shift in whether or not a riot weapon was appropriate or 
safe  had  nothing  to  do  with  differences  in  physiology.  Wooden  and  plastic baton  rounds 
created  injuries which  did  not take  account of generation  or  race.  A predominant concern 
appears to  have been what can  be  portrayed as politically  safe in  a particular context. 
The seductive notion of soft and gentle knockout weapons is recent but not new.  It has its 
roots  back in  the  1970's when  so  called  'non-lethal' weapons formed the  holy  grail  of riot 
weapon Research  &  Development.  During that decade, then Congressman James Scheur 
outlined a new philosophy of crowd control weapons.(see Fig.26). He saw such developments 
resulting  from  'spinoffs  from  medical,  military,  aerospace  and  industrial  research'  and 
expressed the  view  that:  'We  are  now  in  the  process of developing devices and  products 
capable of controlling violent individuals and entire mobs without injury.'
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assessment  is  briefly  examined  below,  particularly  the  assertion  that  control  is  achieved 
without harm. 
Some idea of the range and variety of riot control weapons under consideration at that time 
can  be  gleaned  from  the  1972  US  National  Science  Foundation's  Report  on  Non-lethal 
Weapons.(NSF, 1972). Altogether it listed 34 different weapons, including chemical and kinetic 
weapons;  electrified  water jets;  combined  stroboscopic light and  pulsed  sound  weapons; 
infrasound  weapons;  dartguns which  fire  drug-filled flight  stabilized  syringes;  stench  parts 
which  give  off  an  obnoxious  odour;  the  taser  which  fires  two  small  electrical  contacts 
discharging  50,000  volts  into  the  target;  and  instant banana  peel  which  makes  roads  so 
slippery, they are  impassable. 
Many  of  these  weapons  were  then  only  partly  developed  or had  problems  of  public 
acceptability:others  have  since  achieved  operational  status.  They  include:  incapacitation 
weapons such as the electronic riot shields and electro-shock batons (discussed in Sections 
6,7, & 8 below); Bulk chemical irritant distributor systems, (delivered by watercannon such as 
the UK made Tactica or the many back pack sprays like those made by the Israeli company 
lspra (Fig.27 or the German Heckler & Koch  (Fig.28);  New forms of irritant such as  OC  (or 
peppergas);kinetic impact weapons like the German & UK plastic bullet guns (shown in Fig32) 
or the  South  African  hydraulically fired,  TFM  Slingshot rubber bullet machine;  biomedical 
weapons, such as the compressed air fired drug syringe now commercially available both in 
the US  &  China(shown in  Fig.33). 
The range of weapons currently deployed for crowd control is vast indeed and defies any 
attempts to  be  comprehensive.  In  Britain,  since the first use of CS gas,  rubber bullets and 
water  cannon  at  the  beginning  of  the  Northern  Irish  Conflict  in  1969,  there  has  been  a 
globalisation  of  such  public order  technologies.  To  our knowledge  some  856  companies 
across 47 countries have been or are currently active in the manufacture and supply of such 
weapons.  This proliferation has been fuelled by  private companies wishing to tap lucrative 
security markets, a process which has led to both vertical and horizontal proliferation of this 
technology.(See Appendix 1) For example, one company, Civil Defence Supply, who provide 
nearly all  UK police forces with  sidehandled  batons,  boast of an  international riot training 
programme, having trained the entire Mexican Police Granaderos with armadillo linked riot 
shields,  CS  and  baton  firing  guns  like  the  Arwen  and what they  call  the  complete  'Early 
Resolution System', for its elite forces. 
To understand why this arsenal of crowd control weapons has been developed, it is vital 
23 to understand the thinking which underlies their construction. An  important task in assessing 
new crowd  control technologies is  to  examine the  criteria  used  to  evaluate just what is  an 
'acceptable' police weapon,  and  to  whom.  In  the  discussion  below,  an  attempt is  made to 
clarify  why  the  theory  of 'non-lethal' weapons used for 'minimum  force' policing,  does  not 
match the reality of para-militarised riot squad approaches to  'peacekeeping'. Governments 
themselves have been using Technology Assessment to evaluate the relative effectiveness 
of such weapons.  For example, since 1963, there has been an  exchange of information on 
public order weapons between the US, Canada, Britain & Australia, allowing Parton Down to 
share  technical  evaluation  of  proposed  non-lethal  hardware,  with  US  military  scientists. 
Virtually all the most recent US government projects on this weaponry have been classified 
as "special access" (see 5.6  below)  but the early work is  quite revealing.  Military scientists 
working  at  the  US  Army  Human  Engineering  Laboratory  in  the  early  1970's elaborated  a 
systematic set of procedures to evaluate the desirable and undesirable effects of particular 
weapons.(See  Chart  5(a),  covering  a  comparative  assessment  of  both  the  medical  and 
physiological  consequences  of  each  weapon  type,  together with  an  evaluation  of  public 
acceptability.(See Chart 5b).
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5.1  Cost-Effective  Cro"Wd  Control Weapons 
The simplistic theory which underlies the use  of riot weapons assumes that a 'minimum 
force' strategy  of area  denial  or dispersal  can  actually  contain  deep seated  conflicts.  The 
problem with this approach is that real peace can never be  simply defined as an absence of 
anyone  remaining  in  the  conflict zones.  'Minimum force'  is  an  elastic concept,  particularly 
when the force deploying it no  longer enjoys widespread legitimacy. 
A dominant assumption behind the acquisition of new police weapons, is the belief that 
they will create both a faster policing response time and a greater cost-effectiveness. Again, 
a key aim has been to save policing resources by either automating certain control functions, 
ampl!fying the rate of particular control activities, or decreasing the number of officers required 
to  perform them.  Consequently, nearly all the weapons discussed in this report,  have been 
functionally  designed to  yield  an  extension of the  scope,  efficiency  and  growth of  policing 
power.  New riot weapons enable police,  paramilitary and state security forces to  distribute 
more coercion to a greater number of people. Therefore they allow a fewer number of officers 
to threaten a larger number of people in a crowd a.,d over a distance. Hence, riot weapons 
allow fewer officers to break up a disturbance than when using unarmed personnel, or a larger 
gathering to be tackled than could otherwise be taken on. The basis of this cost-effectiveness 
criterion has been neatly summed up  by  the then  Brigadier,  Sir Frank Kitson:-
"For example, three or four times as many troops might be required, if  they were only allowed 
persuasion,  as would be  needed if they were allowed to  use  batons and gas;  and three or 
four times as many troops might be needed if they were restricted to using batons and gas, 
as would be required if they were allowed to  use small arms." (Kitson,  1971 ,p90). 
However, although in the short term, it may seem that these weapons can contain overtly 
violent conflict, their use in the longer term may feed or exacerbate the processes responsible 
for its  development.  A  study  undertaken  at the  Richardson  Institute  at the  University  of 
Lancaster,  described evidence of such processes at work in Northern lreland.(Wright, 1987)
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The study found that less-lethal weapons used  in  the  context of a phased  deployment of 
counter-insurgency strategies, could lead to more force being used. In the beginning this was 
24 evidenced by the deployment of higher numbers of riot weapons, then the substitution of each 
new less-lethal weapon by a more severe type. The initial use of water canon thus gave way 
to the use of CS gas. This was augmented by rubber bullets which were then replaced by the 
harder hitting  PVC  variety.(See  Chart 6)  and  in  greater quantities.  Further empirical work 
suggested that because these riot systems were being deployed in the context of a phased 
set of counter-insurgency tactics, the resistance they bred led to a successive  deployment 
of each subsequent and more violent phase of the low intensity conflict programme. In effect 
they bred the dissent they were designed to ''fix". (Wright, 1981) Graphing the deployment of 
less-lethal weapons against the crude indicator of political killings in Northern Ireland revealed 
a pattern which appeared to corroborate this finding. As each new weapon deployment was 
associated  with  an  upsurge  in  the  death  count(See  Chart  7).  Over longer time  periods, 
another study detected predictable levels of weapon utilization. (Wright,  1981) 
For example, fairly constant levels of munitions were used as if the supply itself was the 
greatest determinant of usage. (See Chart 8). A new form of multivariant time series analysis 
was evolved to describe the  effect of deployments of these weapons and tactics.(Wright , 
1987). What emerged was a complex set of causal influences which locked the participants 
into their own violent behaviour. During the period when this conflict broke down, variables 
indicating violent behaviour of the various participants, were most i11fluenced  by  their own 
previous behaviour.(See Chart 9) Paradoxically, whilst these weapons were meant to provide 
a new series of flexible responses, their ultimate effect was to programme their targets into 
traditional  anti-state  activities  and  procedures.  In  otherwords,  their  most  invidious 
characteristic may be to undermine non-violence as a means of public protest.(Wright, 1992) 
The real physical effects of these weapons described below, may go some way to explaining 
their dysfunctional impact on conflict behaviour. 
5.2 Hannless Weapons? - The Scientific Evidence 
Statements made by military scientists and police chiefs about "non-lethal" weapons and 
"minimum force",  have led the public to believe that crowd control weapons were designed 
for humanitarian reasons and  are in fact harmless. Such sentiments have been echoed by 
many  governments and  reinforced  by  reports from  laboratories  and  the  manufacturers 
actually creating the technology of political control. 
If safety was the prime consideration, we might expect the research on such weapons to 
be especially thorough prior to their authorization. Since most future developments are still 
essentially  modifications  of existing  chemical  or kinetic  impact  weapons,  it  is  worth  re-
examining the historical research which has permitted and legitimised this research in respect 
to the European state which has used these weapons the most, i.e. the United Kingdom.5.3 
5.3 Hannless Kinetic Impact Weapons? 
In January 1977, the then Secretary of State For defence, was asked about the research 
on the likely death and injury rates from rubber and plastic bullets carried out  prior to their 
introduction. The reply referred to a report produced by four surgeons working at the Victoria 
Hospital in Belfast in 1972, (two years after rubber bullets had been used in Northern Ireland), 
and said that comparable information for plastic bullets was not available.
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Chart 9.  Multi variant time series analysis of Northern Irish conflict 1976:-1981 The  Belfast surgeons report makes stark reading.(Millar et al,  1972). It informs us that of 
90  patients  who  sought hospital treatment  after being  hit  by  rubber bullets,  41  needed  in 
patient treatment. Their injuries included three fractured skulls, 32 fractures of the facial bones 
(nose,jaw, cheek etc.),  eight ruptured eye globes (all  resulting in  blindness), three cases of 
severe brain damage,  seven cases of lung injury,  and  one case  of damage to  liver,  spleen 
and intestine. The overall role call included one death, two people blinded in  both eyes, five 
with  severe  loss  of vision  in  one  eye  and  four with  sever disfigurement of  the  face.  The 
surgeons also found evidence of rubber bullets being fired at much closer ranges than those 
for which they were designed. Rubber bullets were not meant to be fired at distances of less 
than 25 metres but the surgeons found that half of those brought into hospital had been shot 
at less than 15 metres and one third at less than 5 metres.  Part of the problem is that such 
area  dispersal  weapons  are  meant  to  create  a  dispersal  zone.  If  anyone  is  unfortunate 
enough to  be  in  such  a zone,  there may not be  much choice in  avoiding being targeted by 
such weapons,  since part of their threat is the fear of becoming a random  victim. 
In  the  1970's,  military  researchers  in  the  US  undertook  their  own  research  on  kinetic 
weapons. They concluded that rubber bullets had an extremely high probability of undesirable 
effects in any scenario for their possible operational use. The US Army research undertaken 
on  live animals,  found  that impact weapons with  energy  levels of  above 90  ft lbs,  caused 
injuries, "in the severe damage region."(Thein et al,  1974; Wargovitch et al,  1975). A member 
of BSSRS,  Jonathan Rosenhead,  was able to  use the  comparative kinetic energy/damage 
figures in the US literature, to establish that given their muzzle velocity (about 293ft ibs.), for 
most if not all  of its range,  the  rubber bullet is  in  the  severe damage region.  (Rosenhead, 
1976). 
It is worth noting that for the purposes of this present study,  sample kinetic riot weapons 
from the USA, the UK,  Germany, and the Netherlands were assessed using the original US 
military  criteria  on  impact effects.  It  was found  that  all  these weapons were  in  either the 
dangerous or severe damage region  categories.  (See Chart 4) 
Plastic  Bullets  totally  replaced  rubber  bullets  in  Northern  Ireland  by  1975.  Although 
authoritative sources such  as Janes Infantry Weapons(1976),  asserted that rubber bullets 
were  withdrawn  because  the  disability  and  serious  injury  rates  'were  not  considered 
acceptable', the official explanation was simply the plastic baton round's greater accuracy. 
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Rosen head argued that given the even higher muzzle velocity of the plastic bullet, it was even 
more dangerous, especially at close  range. 
His  analysis has been  amply  born  out by  the  history  of  injuries and  deaths caused  by 
plastic  bullets  in  Northern  Ireland.  A  survey  undertaken  by  Mr  Laurance  Rocke,  (Senior 
Registrar at the Royal Victoria Hospital in  Belfast), reported  in the Lancet during 1983, that 
plastic bullets are  even  more deadly  than the  rubber bullets they replaced.(Rocke,  1983). 
They cause more severe injuries to  the skull and brain and therefore more deaths.  Despite 
the security forces rule that baton rounds must be aimed below the waist, 31  of the 99 plastic 
bullet victims covered in the Rocke survey suffered head injuries. He attributed the difference 
in  the  respective  injuries and  deaths for rubber  and  plastic bullets to  their corresponding 
ballistic characteristics. Plastic bullets caused serious injuries less often than rubber bullets 
because the latter was less stable in flight and tended to hit a victim sideways. Plastic bullets 
resulted in  more fractured skulls, lacerated scalps and deaths. 
More worrying are the human faces behind these statistics. Between May 1973 and August 
31 1984,  12  people were  killed  by  plastic bullets.  Inquests have found  that  six  of  the  twelve 
fatalities were not involved in  any  civil  disturbances when they were  shot and  seven  of  the 
twelve victims were children aged  under 15.
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During August 1981, an international commission of enquiry, sponsored by the Association 
of  Legal  Justice,  travelled  to  Belfast  to  investigate  the  use  of  plastic  bullets.  One  of  its 
members was  senior  British  research  scientist,  Dr.  Tim  Shallice,  who  wrote  in  the  New 
Statesman,  "The  conclusion  seemed  inescapable  to  members  of  the  commission:  the 
Northern Ireland authorities were knowingly allowing widespread, indiscriminate and illegal use 
of a weapon whose lethal potential was well  known."(Shallice,  1981 ). 
Since then it has been very much business as usual. Just last summer in Northern Ireland, 
the RUC  used the now British owned Heckler and Koch anti-riot weapon to fire thousands of 
plastic bullets. Whilst an  immediate inquiry was called, few reports emerged of the way that 
innocent residents out for a night socialising were corralled by Landrovers and fired upon as 
all  escape exits were sealed off. 
Evidence Gathered by the Committee for the Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland 
(CAJ),  suggests a serious flouting  of official  guidelines for the  RUC  use  of  plastic bullets, 
when  over 6002  plastic bullets  were  fired  in  just one  weekend(  July, 1996).  CAJ  recorded 
instances of the RUC firing indiscriminately when no disturbances were going on (including 
people being injured by  plastic bullets as  they were coming  out of  a disco);  young people 
being shot by plastic bullets as they left a fast food restaurant; CAJ observers and journalists 
shot at by  plastic bullets; people who were clearly attempting to  leave areas of disturbance 
were also targeted.  Victims of the  conflict seeking medical attention at Altnagelvin Hospital 
were subject to a baton charge by  riot police who had entered the casualty area dressed in 
full riot gear with dogs. Witness statements were gathered which suggested that many people 
refused  to  seek  treatment  from  injuries  they  sustained  from  baton  rounds  for  fear  of 
arrest.(CAJ,  1996) 
In  suc.h circumstances, the indiscriminate deployment of plastic bullets removes people's 
rights  of  assembly  and  may  remove  their  rights  to  freedom  of  movement  and  in  some 
situations their right to life. The provisions of the UN  Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officers  in  regard  to  the  principle  of  proportionality  appear  to  have  been  breached  last 
summer by  the RUC,  (as well as their duty not to use excessive force if it is possible to  use 
non-violent means before resorting  to force  and firearms).  We  can  think  of  no  reason  to 
challenge the European Parliament's decision of May, 1982 which called for a ban on the use 
of plastic bullets within the EU,  and recommend that the European Parliament reaffirm their 
call for a total ban on  this weapon. 
5.4 Hannless Chemical Irritant Weapons? 
We know that over 300 companies are currently manufacturing and marketing chemical 
incapacitants to military, security, prison and police forces around the world and a vast range 
of equipment is  available,  including cartridges,  grenades, backpack sprays and  hand held 
aerosols. Yet the safety of the commonly used riot control agents is also questionable. In high 
doses they can kill, a reality harshly brought home by deaths of children in South Africa during 
the apartheid years.  Even in lower doses, there are a range of very unpleasant side effects 
including  bronchitis,  asthma,  lung  and  eye  damage,  contact  dermatitis  and  prolonged 
diarrhoea. An examination of the actual research undertaken on CS prior to its authorization 
32 for use in the Derry riots of 1969 reveal some gross omissions and assumptions. The claim 
that  CS  did  not  harm  people  with  breathing  ailments rested  on  a  study  of  two  bronchitic 
rabbits; possible effects on the unborn child were tested by the response on fertilised chicken 
eggs when injected with CS. 
59 Inadequate evidence had been gathered on its effects on those 
suffering  from  heart  complaints  and  experiments  to  determine  whether  or  not  CS  was 
carcinogenic,  were  not  completed  until  two  years  after  it  had  been  intensively  used  in 
Northern Ireland. 
After the 1969 Derry riots, a committee of inquiry was set up, (the Himsworth Committee) 
to  look at the medical and  toxicological effects of  CS.  Although it drew heavily  on  existing 
Parton studies, the Himsworth Committee accepted that under certain circumstances CS can 
kill  and  that  it  can  also  produce  highly  unpleasant  but  non-fatal  injuries  to  the  lungs. 
Himsworth made the sensible recommendation that in future, riot agents should be regarded 
more akin to drugs than weapons and the authorities should publish the results of safety tests, 
in the scientific press, in full, prior to any authorization.(HMSO,Cmnd 4775,1971 ). This is such 
a  clear  and  reasonable  precautionary  stance,  that  we  recommend  that  the  European 
Parliament ajopt it  as the baseline criterion for all the chemical irritants which might ever be 
deployed in  the  EU. 
Alas, for the amount of attention the UK government paid to this recommendation, we have 
only to look at the circumstances surrounding the introduction for use throughout the UK in 
certain special circumstances, of CR in  1973. CR  is an incapacitant which causes temporary 
blindness. According to one Parton report, it feels like being thrown blindfolded into a bed of 
stinging nettles.(See Fig.28)
60 In  1977 the Secretary of State for Defence was challenged to 
withdraw authorization for CR until the Himsworth recommendations were complied with. The 
Minister refused, claiming this was already the case and went on to quote a string of articles 
all except one of which was published after 1973. None of these articles addressed the issue 
of  carcinogenicity,  an  important  consideration  for  chemicals  that  are  intended  for  direct 
spraying on the skin.  If research on these new weapons was not fully completed before they 
were used then the idea that they were deployed because of safety considerations must be 
rejected. Less-lethal weapons of this type are also presented as more acceptable alternatives 
to guns. But these weapons augment rather than replace the more lethal weapons in police 
arsenals.  Euphemistic labels such as watercannon, teargas and rubber bullets are used to 
create the impression that these weapons represent soft and gentle forms of control,  CS is 
never referred  to  by  the  authorities as  vomit gas,  in  spite  of its  capacity  to  cause  violent 
retching. 
A further danger of stronger incapacitating chemicals sprayed directly on to crowds is the 
impact it can have on changing police practices. In the 1960's crowd dispersion was seen as 
the key requirement so that the a provision of escape routes was part of the training packages 
used.  With the  advent of new paralysing systems,  crowd capture becomes a possibility as 
foam  barriers to  seal off all  escape routes become a precursor for mass arrest. This tactic 
was deployed against german anti-nuclear protestors in  Wackendorf,  over ten years ago, 
when  7,000  police  were  used  to  ring  a  crowd  of  1000  activists
61.(See  Fig  29).  On  this 
occasion  chemical foam  was used  in  area  denial  rather  than  capture  so  the  example  is 
illustrative. However, with the back pack sprayers now being produced, much fewer personnel 
could achieve the same tactic. This is part of the problem on the horizon. 
33 5.5  Harmless Irritant Gas Sprays? 
The  introduction  of  hand  held  gas  irritant  sprays  into  Europe  into  countries  such  as 
Germany, France and most recently, the UK,  has yielded an offensive as well as a defensive 
capacity. Again,  in  the  UK we  might have assumed they would be governed by  existing  UK 
policy on  the  introduction of new chemical weapons for domestic control. 
Uptil the nineties, despite intensive research, only four chemical agents were primarily used 
for such purposes, namely CN,  CS,  CR  and most recently (Peppergas)OC. This is because 
there are real difficulties in marrying an agent with low toxicity and high effectiveness. CN and 
CS  (developed by  Porton Down in  the fifties) are in fact war gases and  hundreds of deatils 
are attributed to their use in the Vietnam conflict where they were used to flush out Vietcong 
in  tunnels. 
62 
Porton  scientists  have  always  been  quite  realistic  about  the  possible  dangers  of  new 
chemical weapons for public order control. "As with other foreign chemicals to which man may 
be  exposed,  no  matter  how  detailed,  extensive  and  carefully  effected  are  the  pre-clinical 
toxicity  investigations  and  observations  in  controlled  human  exposures,  there  can  be  no 
complete  guarantee  from  such  studies  that  there  is  absolute  safety  in  use  for  a  given 
chemical."
63  Such caution about weapons designed to be  sprayed directly in the face is well 
founded. Their use in  riot control is  based on  an  assumption that the level of irritant will  be 
dispersed because they will  be  deployed in  wide open  spaces.  There are  special dangers 
associated with using chemical aerosols in tight confines where dangerous concentrations can 
build up. As another scientist has commented," Politician and scientist alike must accept the 
inescapable conclusion that any substance capable of producing an intolerable irritation at low 
concentrations must also produce a concomitantly high toxicity. In other words, the existence 
of ideal riot agents of sufficient safety not to impair the health of rioters or accidently exposed 
innocents is merely notional." 
64 
As  we  have  seen,  there  is  evidence that CS  can  cause  permanent but non-lethal  lung 
damage at  comparatively low doses
65
,  as well as  second degree burns with  blistering and 
severe  dermatitis
66
.  In  situations where  high  exposure to  CS  has occurred,  heart failure, 
hepato=ellur damage  and  death  have  been  reported  (HMSO, 1971 ).  Some  evidence  also 
exists that people subject to repeated doses of CS develop tolerance, further increasing their 
level  of  exposure.
67  One  study  has  concluded  that  a  single  exposure  to  high  level  of 
respiratory  irritants similar to CS  have led to the development of 'reactive airways disease 
syndrome' in some individuals, characterised by prolonged cough  and shortness of breath.
68 
New restraint tactics used alongside gas sprays are a potential recipe for fatalities. 
It is revealing that when tests on  French made (SAE Alsetex) CS spray took place in  the 
UK,  a Metropolitan police inspector suffered burns to  his eyes during tests in  Northampton 
- thought to  be  due  to  the propellant.
69  It also emerged that Dr Jill  Tan,  the  Home  Office 
scientist who gave these devices the all clear, suffered blisters to her face when sprayed with 
the CS product during tests.  Self-Defence expert Inspector Pete Boatman who was training 
the  instructors when  the  accident  happened  has now been  banned from  training  officers 
outside his region because his Chief Constable is worried about being sued by people injured 
by  the incapacitant. 
70  Throughout the C  S trials in the UK , which began on  March 1,  1996, 
the  public were  constantly  reassured  about the  safety  of  this  product based  on  French 
studies, studies undertaken in the USA and military research conducted at Porton Down.  A 
UK Channel 4 Dispatches programme revealed serious flaws in these assumptions.(Liberty, 
34 1996). The French gendarmerie keep no statistics or records of CS use to suggest it is safe. 
Indeed Professor Jean Claud Roujeau of the Hospital  Henri Mondor in Paris can quote much 
evidence to the contrary. "I  have to  disagree because we have seen , in  the last few years, 
several cases of patients suffering from severe skin reactions to these spray. These reactions 
look  like  acute  burns,  they  are  very  spectacular  and  sometimes need  hospitalisation  for 
several  days,  and  can  reach  10-20 per cent of the  body  surface area  of the  patient.  (See 
Fig.30) It is generally agreed that above 20 per cent  there is a risk of death,  so  I think it is 
impossible to  consider these products as generally safe and harmless." (Liberty,  opp cit) 
The British  Government also cited work by the US National Toxicology Programme (NPT) 
in  Boston, but one of the world's leading toxicologists Professor Howard Hu said,  "The NTP 
was purely designed to  assess whether CS can cause cancer in  laboratory animals.  It was 
not  designed  to  see  whether  CS  could  cause  pulmonary  (breathing)  problems  of  a  non 
carcinogenic nature, or skin problems and it really says nothing about the potential of CS to 
cause health problems in  vulnerable people." Professor Hu  also said  that CS  may actually 
cause asthma. "One of tne conditions that CS may cause is commonly referred to as RADS, 
a variant of asthma caused by a very high,  brief intense exposure to an irritant like CS".  He 
also said that CS may be linked to chromosomal mutation- damage to the body's DNA itself. 
In fact, the French  made spray was given a specification in the UK which demanded that 
it  be  a  5%  solution  and  release  5 centileters  of fluid  per burst which  compares with  U.S. 
versions which  contain  a  1%  solution  and  release  a 1%  burst.  In  other words the  French 
Sprays adopted by the UK were 25 times as strong as those used in the United States.  It is 
perhaps somewhat revealing that the UK Government gave the go ahead for deployment of 
these  sprays  before  the  trials  were  complete  and  before  all  the  relevant  research  was 
published in  the scientific press. 
In fact the safety concerns outlined above, are even more pressing in regard to this newly 
introduced disabling chemical,  Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), or' pepper gas'. OC is a new irritant 
based on extracts from Chile pepper. As a plant toxin it is banned for use in war by the 1972 
Biological Weapons convention but not for internal security use. 
Porton  Down  began researching analogues of capsicum  after it was used as  a military 
harassing  agent in  World  War I in  the form  of acylated  vanillylamide  and  its more potent 
homologues such  as  VAN  as  a possible replacement for the riot agent CN.  However, the 
agent  was  predominantly  used  in  the  seventies  for  Porton  funded  studies  in  the 
neurophysiology  of  pain  such  as  those  conducted  in  1975  by  Foster  and  Ramage  at 
Manchester  University's  Medical  School.
71  However,  it  was  in  the  USA  that  companies 
transformed this irritant into a commercial product which is now widely used by both police, 
corrections departments and private citizens. 
The effects of peppergas are far more severe, including temporary blindness which last 
from 15-30 minutes, a burning sensation of the skin which last from 45 to 60 minutes, upper 
body spasms which force a person to bend forward and  uncontrollable coughing making it 
difficult to  breathe or speak for between 3 to  15 minutes. 
For those with  asthma,  taking  other drugs,  or  subject to  restraining techniques  which 
restrict the breathing passages, there is a risk of death. The Los Angeles Times has reported 
at least 61  deaths associated with police use of pepper spray since 1990 in the USA,
72  and 
the  American  Civil  liberties Union  (ACLU)  documented  27  deaths  in  custody  of  people 
35 sprayed with  peppergas in  California alone,  since  1993.
73 
Whilst peppergas has been widely adopted in  the US  and Canada so far it has not seen 
widespread usage in Europe. Nevertheless, several European companies such as France
74
, 
Germany,75  Spain76  and  the  UK
77  are  known  to  be  either  marketing  their  own  brand  or 
importing OC  sprays and  backpacks from the  USA.  However, the US Army  concluded in  3 
1993 Aberdeen  Proving  Ground  study  that pepper spray  could  cause  "Mutagenic effects, 
carcinogenic effects, sensitization, cardiovascular and pulmonary toxicity, neurotoxicity, as well 
as  possible  human  fatalities ... There  is  a  risk  in  using  this  product  on  a large  and  van eo 
population"  (Salem,  1993)  However,  the  pepperspray  got  the  go  ahead  despite  the 
reservations of the US  military scientists after FBI  tests gave it the  all clear. 
It has subsequently been revealed that the head of the  FBI's Less-Than lethal Weapons 
Programme,  Special  Agent Thomas  WW Ward,  took  a  $57,000  bribe  from  a  peppergas 
manufacturer to give the Zarc product Capstun, the all clear.  British researchers highlighted 
the  conflict  of  scientific evidence  to  the  South  California  branch  of ACLU  who  then  took 
vigourous action to  have the agent withdrawn.  Berkley's Police Commission voted for  a 60 
day moratorium on Peppergas. 
78 ACLU is now looking at the legal implications and has asked 
the FBI to immediately retract and rescind all research documentation. Allan Parachini, Public 
Affairs Director of ACLU has said "The Ward Scandal in some ways exceeds the Rodney King 
beatings in  terms  of  its  potential  impact  on  law  enforcement,  since  FBI  research  helped 
convince police departments across the country that pepper spray was a safe and effective 
way to subdue suspects." In fact the breach of trust is much more serious since many other 
countries as  disparate as Australia and India have subsequently adopted peppergas on the 
back of US  research. 
Not  surprisingly,  recent  company  marketing  has focused  on  providing  training  and 
certification to  insulate officers from  lawsuits associated with deaths in custody cases.  The 
effects of OC  are so  severe that companies such  as Bioshield & Foxguard have started to 
marlt.et  decontamination wipes to  meet peppergas "post application requirements which in 
turn reduces the potential for litigation'. 
In the face of such findings, any European Member State who permits the deployment of 
the OC  irritant, may well find themselves facing legal action in the future, if fatalities or other 
unusual impacts emerge.  It is recommended that the European Parliament errs on the side 
of caution and calls for a moratorium on  the  acquisition,  sale and deployment of Oleoresin 
Capsicum  irritant  sprays,  until  independent  research  is  undertaken  on  its  safety  and 
published in full in  the scientific press for peer review. 
5.6 Second Generation Incapacitation Weapons 
In the Nineties, the revolution in  so called 'non-lethal weapons' was given fresh impetus 
by  new US  programmes to  fight internal conflicts  - ostensibly without casualties.  The  US 
Government  was  driven  towards  finding  a  universal  panacea  because  of  a  series  of 
embarrassing and widely publicised debacles including the Rodney King beating, the Waco 
siege  and  their  unfortunate  experiences  in  Somalia,  where  they  failed  in  crowd  control 
operations with only lethal technology. The new policy was avidly pushed in the States by the 
likes of Col.  John  Alexander (who  made  his  name  as  part of the  Phoenix  Assassination 
programmes  during  the  Vietnam  war)  and  science  fiction  writers  such  as  Alvin  Toffler 
(Toffler, 1994) and Janet and Chris Morris, (Morris & Morris, 1990, 1994) and picked up by the 
36 DoD  and  Justice  Department 
Thus a second generation of kinetic, chemical, optico- acoustic, microwave, disabling and 
paralysing technologies is  on  the horizon, to join the  existing arsenal of weapons designed 
for public order control.  Much  of  the  initial  new work has  been  undertaken in  US  nuclear 
laboratories such as Oak Ridge,  Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. Many cynics see the 
work as a rice bowl initiative with scientists looking for new weapons projects to justify their 
future careers as the cold war made their old skill redundant. Already they have come up with 
a pandora's box of new technologies. These include:-
* Ultra-sound generators, which  cause  disorientation,  vomiting  and  involuntary defecation, 
disturbing the  ear system  which  controls balance and  inducing nausea.  The  system which 
uses two speakers can  target individuals in  a crowd. 
* Visual  stimulus and  illusion techniques such as  high  intensity strobes which  pulse in  the 
critical  epileptic  fit-inducing  flashing  frequency  and  holograms  used  to  project  active 
camouflage. 
* Reduced energy kinetic weapons. Variants on the bean bag philosophy whicn ostensibly will 
result in  no damage ( similar claims were once made about plastic bullets). (See Fig  32) 
*New disabling, calmative, sleep inducing agents mixed with DMSO which enables the agent 
to quickly cross the skin barrier and an extensive range of pain causing, paralysing and foul-
smelling  area-denial chemicals.  Some  of these  are  chemically engineered  variants of the 
heroin molecule. They work extremely rapidly,  one touch and disablement follows.  Yet one 
person's tranquillization may  be  another's lethal dose.  (See Fig.33) 
* Microwave and acoustic disabling systems (see  Fig.34). 
*Human capture nets which can be laced with chemical irritant or electrified to pack an extra 
disabling punch.  (See Fig  34) 
* Lick 'em and stick 'em technology such as the Sandia National Laboratory's foam gun which 
expands to between 35-50 times its original volume. Its extremely sticky, gluirg together any 
target's feet and hands to the pavement. (See Fig  35) 
* Aqueous barrier foam which can  be laced with pepper spray 
* Blinding  laser weapons  and  lsotrophic  radiator  shells  which  use  superheated  gaseous 
plasma to  produce a dazzling burst of laser like light.(See Fig.36) 
*Thermal guns which incapacitate through a wall by raising body temperature to 107 degrees. 
* Magnetosphere gun which delivers what feels like a blow to the head. 
We are no longer at a theoretical stage with these weapons. US companies are already 
piloting  new systems,  lobbying hard  and  where  possible,  laying  down  potentially lucrative 
patents.  For  example,  last  year  New  Scientist  reported  that  the  American  Technology 
Corporation  (ATC)  of  Poway  California  has  used  what  it  calls  acoustical  heterodyning 
technology to target individuals in a crowd with infra-sound to pinpoint an individual 200-300 
37 metres  away.  The  system  can  also  project  sonic  holograms  which  can  conjure  audio 
messages out of thin air so just one person hears
79 Meanwhile, Janes' reported that the US 
Army Research Laboratory has produced a variable velocity rifle for lethal or non lethal use -
a new twist to flexible response eo  Other companies are promoting robots for use in riot  and 
prison control 
The  National  Institute  of Justice  in  the  US  is  now actively  soliciting  new ideas for such 
weapons from  corporate bodies, 5
1 and  corporate US  has responded  with  bodies like  SPIE 
(The International Society  For Optical  Engineering), which have enthusiastically responded 
with a special conference on  'Enabling Technologies for Law Enforcement and  Security,  a~ 
the  Hynes Convention centre  in  Boston,  Nov  19- 21,  1996.  The  panel  on  less than  lethal 
technologies has experts talking on  subjects such  as:  The non-lethal laser baton; design of 
a variable velocity gun system for law enforcement applications; sticky shocker; definition of 
lethality thresholds for KE less-lethal projectiles; violence reduction and assailant control with 
laser  sighted  police  pistols;  directed  energy  technologies:  weaponisation  and  barrier 
applications; pepper spray projectile for countering hostage and barricade situations; aqueous 
foam  as a less than  lethal technology for prison applications etc.  A formal Pentagon policy 
on  the  use  of  non-lethal  weapons  was  prepared  last year  in  response  to  Congressional 
instructions to  initiate  a joint acquisitions  programme.  Whilst there  are  practical  problems 
regarding whether it is preferable to leave an enemy or a citizen dead rather than permanently 
maimed, and whether or not hallucinogenic or other psychotropic 'calmative' agents fall foul 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the spending call was for $15 million annually over the 
next three years, to fund new and  existing projects.
82 
Critics of such projects suggest that non-lethal war is a contradiction in terms. Many of the 
so called non-lethal weapons are in  reality are far from non-lethal. They can and have killed, 
maimed, blinded and scalped innocent bystanders. There is a real danger that they will make 
conflicts  more  lethal  by  enraging  crowds  and  by  paralysing  people  making  them  more 
vulnerable to other operations by the military and security forces. In that sense these weapons 
could be considered pre-lethal and actually lead to higher casualty rates.(See above) In fact 
the  US proponents of these weapons are under no  illusions. Their focus is  'not to replace 
lethal munitions but to augment existing and future capabilities which will provide a spectrum 
of force response options.'
83 The area most commentators have not addressed is the extent 
that such weapons will help the military create new roles for themselves as part of internal 
policing operations. 
Most of the debate has been about their role in war. We know from the proceedings of the 
Non  Lethal  Defence  II  conference,  (organised  by  The  American  Defence  Preparedness 
Association  held  in  March  last  year),  that  the  that  the  Joint  Program  Office  of  Special 
Technology  Countermeasures  (JPO-STC)  have  developed  a  multi-service  co-ordination 
strategy that incorporates both the HQ Allied Forces of Southern Europe and the 'Doctrine & 
Training HQ' of the United Kingdom.
84 Other formal liaison links between the USA non-lethal 
research  community  and  Member  States  are  anticipated  but  little  public information  has 
emerged. 
The work done so far has led to dubious weapons based on  dubious research,  strongly 
influenced by commercial rather than humanitarian considerations. There is a pressing need 
for a wide ranging debate in  the European Parliament of the humanitarian and civil liberties 
implications of allowing these weapons on to European soil to become part of the technology 
of political control in the EU.  Much of the work that has been undertaken in  secret,  but part 
of the  bibliography  of the  present report covers  a representative  sample  of  the  available 
literature. What is required is a much more detailed assessment of these weapons than space 
38 permits here and it is recommended that a new study be commissioned to achieve this work. 
In the meantime, it would be useful to ask for the European Commission to report on existing 
liaison arrangements between Member  St~tes and  the US  on  Non-lethal weapons and  the 
nature and extent of any joint activities. 
5.6  RECOMMENDATIONS 
(i).  Informed by  principle 3 of the  United  Nations Basic Principles on  The  Use of Force  & 
Firearms (which states that: " the development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating 
weapons  should  be  carefully  evaluated  in  order  to  minimise  the  risk  of  endangering 
uninvolved  persons,  and  the  use  of  such  weapons  should  be  carefully  controlled.")  and 
principle 4 (which require governments to take steps to ensure that arbitrary or abusive use 
of force is not used by law enforcement officers, and that force is used "only if other means 
remain  ineffective"),  the  committee  should  consider  asking  the  European  Parliament  to 
reaffirm its demand of May 1982, for a ban on  the use of plastic bullets. 
(ii).  In  the light of last summer's events at Drumcree in  Northern Ireland, the Committee is 
advised to  seek confirmation from the Commission that:  Member States are fully aware of 
their responsibilities under Principles 3 and 4 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force & Firearms by  Law Enforcement Officials and to  ask for clarification of exactly 
what steps individual Member States  are taking  to  ensure that these are fully  met as the 
power of "less-lethal weapons" changes and whether consistent standards apply 
(iii).  The European Parliament should be  asked to establish objective criteria for assessing 
the biomedical effects of so called non-lethal weapons that are independent from existing 
commercial or governmental research undertaken to-date. It is also recommended that further 
research  is  commissioned  on  the  range  and  types  of  technologies  which  have  been 
developed  by  the  US  non-lethal  doctrine  so  far.  together  with  an  assessment  of  their 
anticipated and unforseen  social and political implications. 
(iv). The Commission should be requested to report on  the existing liaison arrangements for 
the second generation of non-lethal weapons to enter European Union from the USA and call 
for an  independent  report on their alleged safety as well as their intended and unforseen 
social and political effects.  During the interim period, deployment by the police,  the military 
or paramilitary special forces, of US made or licensed chemical irritant, kinetic, acoustic, laser, 
electromagnetic  frequency,  capture,  entanglement,  injector  or  electrical  disabling  and 
paralysing weapons, should be prohibited within Europe. 
(v).  The  European  Parliament  should:  (a)Note  the  biased  research  on  Peppergas  (OC) 
undertaken by corrupt FBI officials and the continuing use of FBI safety assurances in other 
countries  on  the  basis  of  this  flawed  research;  (b)Call  for  a  ban  on  Peppergas(OC) 
deployment or  usage  within  EU  Member States. until new independent research on OC is 
undertaken. 
(vi).  That all  research on chemical irritants should be published in  open scientific journals 
before authorization for any usage is permitted and that the safety criteria for such chemicals 
should be treated as if they were drugs rather than riot control agents. 
(vii).  Research  on  the  alleged  safety  of  existing  crowd  control weapons and of all future 
innovations in  crowd control weapons should  be placed  in  the public domain prior to any 
decision towards deployment. 
39 6.  NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Some  of  the  equipment  described  above,  such  as  the  surveillance,  area  denial, 
surveillance and crowd control technologies, also finds a ready use inside permanent prisons 
and houses of correction. Other devices such as the area denial, perimeter fencing systems 
such as portable coils of razor wire, prison transport vehicles with mini cage cells, and tagging 
equipment are used to  create temporary holding centres. 
Permanent prisons are however, literally custom built control environments, where every 
act  and  thing,  including  the  architecture,  the  behaviour  of  the  prison  officers  and  daily · 
routines,  are  functionally  organised  with  that  purpose  in  mind.  Therefore  many  of  the 
technologies discussed  above  are  built  in  to  the  prison  structure  and  integral  to  policing 
systems used to contain their inmates. For example, area denial technology, intruder detection 
equipment and  surveillance  devices are  instrumental  in  hermetically  sealing  high  security 
prisons. Everything from electronically operated prison gates and cell doors, to razor wire and 
video surveillance on the perimeter walls,  serve this end. 
If disturbances develop within a prison, the riot technologies and tactics outlined above, 
are also available for use by  prison officers. The trend has been to train specialized MUFTI 
(Minimum Force Tactical Intervention ) squads for this purpose. Outside Europe, irritant gas 
has been used not only  to  crush revolt but also  to  punish  political  detainees,
85  or to eject 
reticent prisoners from their cells before execution.
86 Anyone deemed to be a trouble maker 
may  become  the  potential  target for further  containment,  the  type  and  variety  of  which, 
depend to a large extent on the prevailing norms and political climate. Thus physical restraint 
equipment covers a range from straitjackets  and body-belts at one end of the spectrum to 
thumbcuffs and leg shackles at the other. Recently, the International Observatory on Prisons 
criticized  Spain's  so  called  Register  of  Special  Treatment  Prisoners  held  in  solitary 
confinement for prolonged periods and said this could be infringing the European Convention 
against Torture.
87 
Other approaches include special stripped and padded cells, segregated units which have 
been L'SAd  Inverness in Scotland to form a cage within a cage;
88 isolation units like the now 
abandoned system used at Wakefied Jail;
89 the Tote Trakt cells used to imprison the Bader-
Meinhof gang in Germany, which were designed to mimic sensory deprivation; or entire blocks 
of segregated isolation cells like the 750 Security Housing Units and 3,000 maximum security 
cells run by the California House of Corrections department at the punitive warehousing prison 
at Pelican  Bay
90
.  The Pelican Bay  complex is  a good example of where  a  lack of proper 
accountability can bring widespread systematic abuse, even if the prison is one of the most 
modern. In  1995, Judge Thelton E.  Henderson said the  prison was one of the most abusive 
and that prison officers not only ignored the abuses but "also followed a management strategy 
that permitted the use of excessive force for the purpose of management and deterrence." 
The Judge informed the Federal District Court of guards who assaulted prisoners in cells with 
batons, high voltage taser guns, chained them up for hours in "fetal restraints" with their wrists 
bound to their ankles for 22 hours a day .
91 
Apart from mechanical restraint, prison authorities also have access to  pharmacological 
approaches for immobilising inmates, colloquially known as 'the liquid cosh.' These vary from 
psychotropic drugs such as anti-depressants, sedatives and tranquilliser to powerful hypnotics. 
Drugs like largactil or Seranace offer the chemical equivalent of a strait jacket and their usage 
is  becoming  increasingly  controversial  as  prison  populations rise  and  larger numbers on 
inmates are  'treated'.  In  the  United  States,  the  trend  for punishment to  become  therapy 
reaches  its  apotheosis  with  'behaviour  modification'  which  uses  Pavlovian  reward  and 
40 punishment routines to recondition behaviour. Drugs like anectine, (a curare derivative), which 
produce either fear or pain, are used in aversion therapy. In prisons, the possibilities of testing 
new social control drugs are extensive, whilst actual controls are few.  Houses of correction 
form  the  new  laboratories  for  developing·· the  next  generation  of  drugs  for  social 
reprogramming, whilst the pharmacology laboratories of both the universities and the military, 
provide scores of new psychoactive drugs each year.
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Way  back  in  the  1970's,  J.A  Meyer  of  the  US  Defence  Department  suggested  a 
countrywide network of transceivers for monitoring all prisoners on parole, via an irremovable 
transponder.
93 The idea was that parolees movements could be continuously checked and the 
system would facilitate certain areas or hours to be out of bounds, whilst having the economic 
advantage of cutting down on  the costs of clothing and feeding the prisoner. If prisoners go 
missing,  the  police can  automatically home in  on  their last position.  The  system  came into 
operation use in  America in  the  mid  1980's when some private prisons started to operate a 
transponder based parole system.
94  The  system  has now spread into Canada and  Europe 
where it is known as electronic tagging.  Whilst the logic of tagging is difficult to  resist, critics 
have argued that whilst tagging carries the promise of being an effective alternative to prison, 
a look at the criminological literature, this assertion is questionable.(MacMahon, 1996). The 
clientele appears not to  be  offenders who would have  been  imprisoned but rather low risk 
offenders who are most likely to be released into the community anyway. Because of this, the 
system is not cheaper since the authorities gain the added expense of supplying monitoring 
devices to offenders who would have been released anyway. Electronic tagging is however 
beneficial to the companies who sell such systems. Tagging also has a profitable role inside 
prisons  in  the  U.S.  and  in  some  prisons,  notably,  DeKalb  County  Jail  near  Atlanta,  all 
prisoners are bar coded.(Christie,  1993,p.96) 
Critics such  as  Lilly  &  Knepper (1992,  186-7) argue  that in  examining  the  international 
aspects of crime control as industry, more attention is needed to the changing activities of the 
companies which used to provide supplies to the  military.  At the end  of the  cold war,  "with 
defence  contractors  reporting  declines  in  sales,  the  search  for  new  markets  is  pushing 
corporate  decision making,  it  should  be  no  surprise to  see  increased corporate activity  in 
criminal justice." Where such companies previously profited from wars with foreign enemies, 
they are increasingly turning their energy to the new opportunities afforded by crime control 
as  industry.(Christie,  1994).  Increasingly  in  the  U.S,  we  witness  the  trend  toward  private 
prisons  and  the  critical  issue  here  is  can  the  privatisation  of  prison  control  create  a 
rehabilitation process if  its dominant raison d'etre is profit from  control  systems and  hence 
cost cutting. 
Many European countries are now experiencing a rapid process of privatisation of prisons 
by corporate conglomerations, predominantly from the USA. Many of the prisons run by these 
organisations in  the  US  have cultures and control techniques which are  alien to  European 
traditions.  Such  a  process  of  privatisation  can  lead  to  a  bridgehead  for  importing  U.S. 
corrections mentality, methods and technologies into Europe and there is a pressing need to 
ensure a consensus on what constitutes acceptable practice. There is a further danger that 
such privatisation will lead to  cost cutting practices of human warehousing, rather than the 
more long term  beneficial practice of prisoner rehabilitation. 
In  some  European  countries,  particularly  Britain,  where  changes  in  penal  policy  are 
leading to a rapid rise in prison population without additional resources being applied to the 
sector,  the  imperative  is  to  cut  costs  either through  using  technology  or  by  privatising 
prisons.
95  Already, the UK Prison Service has compiled a shopping list of computer based 
options with existing CCTV surveillance systems being complemented by geophones, identity 
41 recognition technology and forward looking infra-red systems which can  spot weapons and 
drugs.
96 Alongside such proactive technologies,  UK prisons will face increasing pressure to 
tool  up for trouble.  Much  this weaponry  including  the  contract for between  £950,000  and 
£2,500,000 of  side handled batons, kubotans, riot shields etc.  made by the Prison Service 
in  March 1995,  are likely to  be  originally manufactured in  the United States.
97 
The  U.S.A adopts a far more militarised prison regime than anywhere in  Europe outside 
of Northern Ireland. A massive  prison industrial complex has mushroomed to  maintain the 
strict control regimes that typify American Houses of Correction.  The future prospect is of that 
alien technology coming here, with very little in the way of public or parliamentary debate  ..  A 
few examples of US  prison technologies and  proliferation illustrate the  dangers. 
Many US prisons now use peppergas. The Department of Justice and every Federal Court 
that has looked  at  its  use  in  correctional facilities  has found  abuses.  For example at  the 
privately run  West Tenessee Detention Facility,  prison  guards pumped  peppergas into two 
dormitories seized by inmates.
98 In late 1994, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 
investigated a County Jail in  Syracuse, New York,  and reported "an unacceptably high and 
improper  use  of  pepperspray  .. Nearly  every  inmate  told .. of  excessive  and  improper 
use .. particularly when inmates are not resistant and after the inmate has been restrained and 
presents no  danger."  One  suicidal  inmate  in  Syracuse was  restrained  with  three  cans  of 
pepperspray  and  died  shortly  afterwards  of  positional  asphyxia.
99  In  the  US,  Federal 
Laboratories  are  already  marketing  a  remote  control  systems  (TG  Guard),  which  can 
automatically dispense peppergas through specific zones in a prison complex from a remote 
firing location.
100 (See Fig.  37). 
Many prisons in  the  U.S,  use Nova electronic 50,000 volt extraction  shields,  electronic 
stun  prods and  most recently  the  REACT  remote  controlled  stun  belt.s.  In  1994,  the  US 
Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons  decided  to  use  remote-controlled  stun  belts  on  prisoners 
considered  dangerous  to  prevent  them  from  escaping  during  transportation  and  court 
appearances. By May 1996, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections said that no longer will 
inmates be  chained together "but will  be  restrained by  the  use of stunbelts and  individual 
restraints. " Stun Tech of Cleveland Ohio has said that it wants to see its stunbelts introduced 
into the chain gang programs of Alabama,  Florida and  Lousisiana.  In fact by  1996,  it was 
reported that the  US  Marshals service and over 100 county agencies have obtained such 
belts  as  well  as  16  state  correctional  agencies  including  Alaska,  California,  Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,  Ohio and Washington (Amnesty International,  1997). 
Stun  Tech  literature claims that its high pulse stun  belt can be activated from  300 feet. 
After a warning noise, the Remote Electronically Activated Control Technology (REACT) belt 
inflicts a 50,000 volt shock for 8 seconds. This high pulsed current enters the prisoners left 
kidney region then enters the body of the victim along for example blood channels and nerve 
pathways. Each pulse results in a rapid body shock extending to the whole of the brain and 
central nervous system. The makers promote the belt 'for total psychological supremacy .. of 
potentially troublesome prisoners.' Stunned prisoners lose control of the bladders and bowels. 
'After all, if you were wearing the contraption around your waist that by the mere push of a 
button in someone's hand, could make you defecate or urinate yourself, what would you do 
from the psychological standpoint?"
101  Amnesty International wants Washington to ban the 
belts because they can be used to  torture,  and calls them, 'cruel,inhuman and  degrading. 
"Some officials say the belts can save money because fewer guards would be needed. But 
human rights activists and some jailers oppose them as the most degrading new measure in 
an increasingly barbaric field." (Kilborn, 1997) Already,  some European countries are in the 
process of evaluating stunbelt systems for use here.(Marks, 1996) 
42 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible for a prison population of some 101,000 
inmates experiencing according to  their Chief of Security,  Jim  Mahan,  a 25% overcrowding 
effect within the  81  feral prisons across the U.S.A. An  additional 17  new facilities are under 
construction and 10 others will be privati sed. As a result of rising tensions within US jails and 
the  need  to  respond,  the  federal  Bureau  of Prisons has become a formal  part of the  new 
research programme on less-lethal weapons. Disturbance control squads are specialised units 
used in US jails to quell riots and Mahan identified future needs in term of (a) aqueous foams: 
(b)containment nets;  (c)  anti-traction  devices;  (d)aes!hetic darts/pellets;  (e)  chemical  area 
dispensers;  (f)  noise  weapons  such  as  acoustic  generators;  (g)  infra-ultrasound;  (h)  low 
energy  lasers;  (i)optical  munitions in  addition  to  the  kinetic energy,  chemical  and  electrical 
weapons they now deploy .
102 
Without proper licensing and a clear consensus on what is expected from  private prisons 
in Europe, multinational private prison conglomerations could act as a bridgehead for similar 
sorts of technology to enter the European crime control industry. Proper limits need to be set 
when a licence is granted with a comprehensive account taken of that company's past track 
record in terms of civil liberties, rehabilitation and crisis management rather than just cost per 
prisoner held. 
6.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Committee should ask the Commission to:-
(i).  Ensure that the UN  Minimum treatment of prisoners rules banning the use of leg irons on 
prisoners are implemented in  all  EU  correctional facilities. 
(ii). Implement a ban on the introduction of inbuilt gassing systems inside European gaols on 
the basis of the manufacturers warnings of the dangers of using chemical riot control agents 
in  enclosed spaces.  Restrictions should also be made on the use of chemical irritants from 
whatever source in correctional facilities wherever research has  shown that a concentration 
of that irritant could either kill  or be  associated with permanent damage to  health. 
(iii). Ensure that all private prison operations within the European Union should be subject to 
a common and consistent licensing regime by the host member. No licence should be granted 
where  proven  human rights violations by that contractor have been made elsewhere.  Any 
failure to secure a licence in one European state sho•Jid  debar that private prison contractor 
from  bidding  for  other  European  contracts  (pending  evidence  of  adequate  human  rights 
training and appropriate improvements in standard operating procedures and controls by that 
corporation or company). 
(iv).  Seek agreement between all  Member States to  ensure that: 
(a)  All riot control, prisoner transport and extraction technology which is in use or proposed 
for  use  in  all  prisons,  (whether  state  or  privately  run},  should  be  subject  to  prior 
approval by the competent member authorities on the basis of independent research; 
(b)  Automated systems of indiscriminate punishment such  as  built in  baton  round firing 
mechanisms, should be prohibited. 
(c).  The  use  of  electro-shock  restraining  devices  or  other  remote  control  punishment 
devices including shock- shields should be  immediately suspended in  any private or 
public prison in  the European Union, until and unless independent medical evidence 
43 can clearly demonstrate that their  use will not contribute to  deaths in custody, torture 
or other cruel,  inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
(v) The European Parliament should be requested to establish a rigorous independent and 
impartial inquiry into the  use of stun  belts,  stunguns and  shields  , and  all  other types and 
variants of electro-shock weapons in Member States, to assess their medical and other effects 
in terms of international human rights standards regulating the treatment of prisoners and the 
use of force; the inquiry should examine all known cases of deaths or injury resulting from the 
use of these instruments, and the results of the inquiry should be  published without delay 
(vi).  Prohibit the  use of kill  fencing  and  lethal  area  denial  systems in  any  prison whether 
private or public, within the European Union 
7.  INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES &  TECHNOLOGIES 
Millennia of research and development have been expended in  devising ever more cruel 
and  inhumane  means  of  extracting  obedience  and  information from  reluctant  victims  or 
achieving excruciatingly painful and long-drawn-out deaths for those who would question or 
challenge  the  prevalent  status  quo.  What  has  changed  in  more  recent  times  is  (i)  the 
increasing requirement for speed in  breaking down prisoners' resistance; (ii) the adoption of 
sophisticated methods based on  a  scientific approach and (iii)  a  need for invisible torture 
which  leaves  no  or  few  marks  wh:ch  might  be  used  by  organisations  like  Amnesty 
International to label a particular government, a torturing state. 
103 According to Amnesty, there 
is  also  an  increasing  trend  for  torture  and  ill  treatment  to  directed  at  common  criminal 
suspects  and  social  'underdogs'  such  as  immigrants  and  members  of  racial  minorities 
(Forrest, 1996). Today, the phenomena of torture has grown to a worldwide epidemic. A report 
by the Redress Trust in  1995, found that 151  countries were involved in torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment (Fig.38),  despite the fact that 106  states have ratified,  acceded to  or 
signed the Convention Against Torture.
104 
The advent of modern torture technique can be traced back to the Russian NKVD, which 
used sensory deprivation and multiple levels of brutality to induce stress before 'conveyor'-
style questioning by relays of interrogators for days on end, therby industrialising state terror. 
These approaches had  the dual requirement of extracting information and breaking down 
personality in  order to  elicit public confessions as the era of the 'show trial' opened up. 
105 
There is a continuum between such coerced confessions and torture.
106 
These techniques can themselves be regarded as part of an  evolving technology which 
can be further researched and developed before being transferred elsewhere. Again, like all 
the  technology  of political  control,  torture  technology  has three  components,  hardware, 
software  and  liveware  (the  human  elements),  which  are  all  woven  together  to  form 
manipulative programmes of socio-political control. The hardware  can include both modern 
and  medieval prisoner restraining,  disabling and repressive technologies, for example leg 
shackles,  thumbcuffs, and suspension equipment, which despite being prohibited by Rule 33 
of the  United  Nations  Standard  Minimum  Rules For the  Treatment  of  Prisoners(United 
Nations, 1955), 
107 are still being manutactured(Fig.39 & Fig.40); 
108 it also encompasses blunt 
trauma-inducing  drugs (e.g.  Aminazin,  apomorphine,  curare,  suxamethonium,  haloperidol, 
insulin,  sulfazin,  triftazin,  tizertsin,  sanapax.  etaperazin,  phrenolong,  trisedil,  mazjeptil, 
seduksin and motiden-depo {Plate and Darvi, 1981 ). After World War II, the USA for example, 
undertook  considerable  research  on  the  use  of  drugs  for  obtaining  intelligence  from 
interrogees independent from their volition, for example, project Chatter.
109 This research was 
expanded  during  the  Korean  War  and  included  laboratory  experiments  on  animals  and 
44 humans using Anabasis aphylla, scoplamin and mescaline in order to determine their speech 
inducing qualities.  Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project.
110 The CIA 
later expanded this work in what became known as Projects Bluebird and Artichoke. A whole 
series of projects were then  initiated under Projects MKDEL  TA and  MKUL  TRA  which were 
concerned  with  'the  research  and  development  of  chemical,  biological  and  radiological 
materials capable for employment in clandestine operations to  control human behaviour.'
111 
Much  of  the  CIA  work  on  behaviour  modification  was  later  adapted  towards  less-lethal 
disabling chemicals.
112 More recently,  Spain has been accused of using vagrants to test the 
use  of anaesthetic drugs to  make it easier for the security forces to  kidnap guerillas of  the 
Basque separatist organisation ET A.
113 
7.1  Torture  Hardware 
Other  torture  hardware  includes  electroshock weapons,  electrically  heated  hot  tables, 
whips, iron-chain filled rubber hoses, cat-o'-nine-tails, clubs, canes, specially designed torture 
devices and interrogation rooms using white noise(Fig.41) (Sweeney 1991a and 1991b) and 
stroboscopic UV light (New Scientist, 1973). Much of this equipment is home made but some 
of the newer technologies are purpose built and may be used by successive law enforcement 
agencies after one torturing regime is replaced by another. For example, the 'Apollo machine' 
which was devised by SAVAK, the  Shah's secret police in  Iran (it delivered an electric shock 
to sensitive parts of the body. while a steel helmet covered prisoners' heads to amplify their 
screams), was also used by  the  succeeding regime's religious police.(Mather, 1982) 
Helen Bamber, Director of the British Medical Foundation for the Treatment of the Victims 
of Torture,  has  described  electroshock  batons  at 'the  most  universal  modern  tool  of  the 
torturers'  (Gregory, 1995)  Recent  surveys  of  torture  victims  have  confirmed  that  after 
systematic  beating,  electroshock  is  one  of  the  most  common  factors  (London,  1993); 
Rasmussen, 1990). If one looks at the country reports of Amnesty International, electroshock 
torture is the Esperanto of the most repressive states. Many examples of its use have been 
reported including Austria, 
114 Greece (Council of Europe, 1994); China (Amnesty International 
1992b), Ballantyne,  1992, 1995); and  Saudi Arabia (Amnesty  International,  1994). Amnesty 
International has just published a survey of fifty countries where electric shock torture and ill 
treatment has been recorded  since  1990.
115 
According to  the manufacturers, the  new pulsed variants of electroshock weapon were 
developed in the 1980's on the basis of biomedical research. They come in several variants 
including hand held prods and batons, (Fig.42) electrified riot shields (Fig.43) and electrified 
dart  systems  like  the  Taser  (Fig.44.).  Electroshock weapons  work  on  the  induction  coil 
principle. They are battery powered devices which step up the voltage several thousand fold 
to produce a high voltage low amperage shock that affects the victim's muscle control. As well 
as severe pain and a temporary paralysis, such weapons also achieve a psychological effect 
because of the dancing display of crackling blue lightning which traverses the electrodes of 
both shields and prods. 
An  independent survey by  the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS) (commissioned by the 
British  Home  Office),  examined  the  possible  hazardous  effects  of  a  range  of  different 
electroshock devices on the human body (Robinson et al., 1990). The FSS study reported that 
receiving a typical discharge from an electroshock prod up to half a second startles and repels 
the  victim;  one  to  two  seconds and  the  victim  loses the  ability  to  stand  up;  three  to  five 
seconds and loss of skeletal muscle control is total and immobilization occurs. The effect can 
last for between  five and fifteen minutes. The FSS study also reported that modern pulsed 
electroshock weapons are more powerful than the old fashioned cattle prods by  nearly two 
45 orders of magnitude. 
Portable electrified riot shields have been manufactured since the mid-1980's for prisoner 
capture and control They comprise a transparent polycarbonate plate through which metal 
strips are interlaced. A button activated induction coil in the handle sends 40,000 - 100,000 
volts arcing across the metal strips,  accompanied by intermittent indigo flashing sparks and 
an intimidating crackle as  the air between the electrodes is ionized. They work by  charginq 
up and then instantly discharging a capacitor, to  produce a chain of high impulse shocks.  A 
sales video shows how the victim  can  be  instantaneously thrown to  the ground on  impact. 
completely incapacitated. 
Manufacturers' claims that these  products are "safe" are open to  interpretat.ion.  Deaths 
have been reported from both Tasers
116  and from  shock shields.
117  One of the key  experts 
used by  manufacturers of electro-shock weapons to justify claims of the  generic safety  of 
these  devices has refuted  such  an  interpretation.
118  There is  also  the  need  to  take  into 
account the  political context in  which many of these weapons are used since  push button 
torture may be just one methodology applied as  part of an entire spectrum of abuse. 
7.2 Tortu!'f'  Software 
Apart from such hardware, there are also numerous standard operating procedures which 
form  the  'software'  component  of  torture.  Examples  of training  supplied  to  authoritarian 
regimes  include  the  low intensity  conflict training  used  to  capture,  stress  and  'soften  up' 
dissidents (Watson 1980), advisory support and technical assistance, including teaching of 
scientific methods of 'deep interrogation' procedures and the  more brutal forms of human 
destruction. 
Research and development in  modern torture techniques and technologies has focused 
upon methods which cause  suffering and  intimidation without leaving  much in  the way  of 
embarrassing  long-term  visible  evidence  of  brutality.  However,  researchers  in  torture 
rehabilitation are gradually evolving more sophisticated methods for detecting and verifying 
the use of torture (Karlsmark et al, 1988;  Rasmussen and Skylv, 1993). 
A vast range of torture techniques have been evolved.
119 The names of these techniques 
signify how systematized this behaviour has become. Some torturing states evolve their own 
lexicon of systematized abuse. For example, in China there are dian ji (electrical assault), gui 
bian (down on knees whipping), jieju (chains and fetters), shouzhikao (finger cuffs), zhiliaio 
(rod fetters), menbanliao (shackleboard) (Figs.39,40, & 45.) and so on, (Human Rights Watch, 
1992; Amnesty International, 1992b)no A similar set of routinized torture techniques emerged 
in Latin America in the 1970's. (Figs. 46,47 &  48). 
The flow of modern repressive 'technique' includes expertise in courses on low intensity 
conflict management in operations deemed to be 'counter terror' or operations other than war. 
Some  of these  approaches  are  formally  coded.
121  In  January  1997,  for  example,  a  CIA 
'Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual  was released in response to a FOIA request 
and detailed torture methods against suspected subversives during the 1980's refuting claims 
by the agency that no such methods were taught there.
122 
Intense interrogation methodologies border on torture, particularly when they incorporate 
scientific approaches based on psycho-pharmacology or sensory deprivation, or involve levels 
of physical terror and softening-up processes of intimidation which sap the will of the prisoner 
to resist. What has evolved from this quest for ever more powerful techniques to break the 
46 human spirit is a classical form  of operant conditioning designed to teach the target psyche 
debilitation,  dependence  and  dread  (Biderman  &  Zimmer,  1965.(See  Chart  1  0).  Just 
occasionally,  hard  evidence  of  such  research  comes  to  light  (Anon, 1993).  In  the  case  of 
Northern Ireland,  BSSRS member Tim  Shallice was probably the first to  identify a scientific 
methodology at work in the pre-interrogation treatments (See Chart 11 ))  used on detainees 
in the first wave of internment introduced into Northern Ireland in  1971. Shallice identified the 
real nature of the special treatment dished out to a selected few - associating it with sensory 
deprivation  techniques  (Shallice,  1973)  (See  Chart  12),  and  an  experiment where  those 
targeted were  "guineapigs" according to  McGuffin (1974). 
In Northern Ireland, the findings of pioneer sensory isolation pioneers such as Hebb, 1958; 
Smith & Lensky,  1959, Lilly,  1955 and Zubek and Solomon et al.  1959, were modified by the 
British  Army  to  create  a  new  process  of  coercive  and  debilitating  torture  which  left  no 
marks. 
123 hebb found that after leaving such experiments, volunteers were disorientated and 
very suggestible to propaganda. We can  conclude that in  the far more disturbing conditions 
of  arrest,  the  anxiety  created  by  these  techniques  would  confuse  the  victims'  thought 
processes so much that they would fall easy prey to the bad man-good man act.  The works 
of  Lilly,  Smith  and  Lensky  showed  that  among  the  after-effects  of  sensory  deprivation 
experiences were loss of identification, feelings of unreality and disorientation. Fear and panic 
were found to be common in anyone remaining in an environment of perceptual deprivation 
for more than two hours. As was apparent from the psychological research, anything over 24 
hours  'at  the  wall'  would  be  sufficient  to  induce  psychotic  breakdown.  It  has  now  been 
established that the long term effects of such experiences are traumatic neuroses comparable 
to  shell shock or in  modern parlance, it rapidly induced post traumatic stress syndrome. 
124 
We know that such approaches are designed to intimidate the wider population rather than 
just to  extract specific information from  any  one  individual;  they  are  heuristic and  can  be 
taught  to  others  (See  McHardy,  1976  and  the  Times,  1980).  The  parallels  of  the  British 
techniques with  those of the  CIA  Human  Resource Training  Manual discussed above  are 
striking. The CIA manual discusses using intense fear, deep exhaustion, solitary confinement, 
unbearable anxiety, standing to attention for long periods of time, sleep and food deprivation, 
stripping  suspects  naked  and  keeping  them  blindfolded  in  windowless,  dark  interrogation 
rooms with no toilet. Only in  January of 1997, did the CIA formally renounce and prohibit its 
agents from using these  torture manuals.
125  In the meantime, variants of this methodology 
have appeared elsewhere, e.g. by the Palestinian Authority which was set up in May 1994.
126 
Some interrogation techniques are intended to kill. For example the use of a heavy wooden 
roller to  crush  the  limbs  of  detainees  in  Kashmir.  This  practice  results  in  the  release  of 
myoglobin, heme and other related muscle proteins and toxins (Rhabdomyolysis) which leads 
to acute renal failure. In the absence of kidney dialysis, the results are fatal. 
127 Other regimes 
have  resorted  to  delayed  poisoning  of  their  dissidents  who  die  after their  release  from 
incarceration, e.g. by the use of Thallium which was deployed against Kurds in Iraq and most 
recently (according to the ongoing Truth Commission), by  South Africa's Apartheid regime
128
. 
7.3 Torture Liveware 
In any bureaucracy of repression, there are personnel schooled in the ideological attitudes 
necessary  to keep such systems in operation (Fig.49).  In some cases  this  schooling takes 
place literally, for example at the infamous School of the Americas based at Fort Benning in 
47 General Method  Effects (Purposes)  Variants 
1.  Isolation.  Deprives victim of all social support of  Complete solitary confinement. Complete isolation. Semi isolation. 
his ability to resist. Develops an intense  Group isolation. 
concern with self. Makes victim 
' 
dependent upon interrogator. 
2.  Monopolisation of  Fixes attention upon immediate  Physical isolation. Darkness or bright light. Barren environment. 
Perception.  predicament. Fosters introspection. 
Eliminates stimuli competing with those 
Restricted movement. Monotonous food. 
controlled by captor.  Frustrates all 
action not consistent with compliance. 
3.  Induced Debility  Weakens mental and physical ability to  Semi-starvation. Exposure.  Exploitation of wounds.  Induced illness. 
Exhaustion.  resist.  Sleep deprivation. Prolonged constraint. Prolonged interrogation. 
Forced writing. Over-exertion. 
4.  Threats.  Cultivates anxiety and despair.  Threats of death. Threats of non return. Threats of endless 
interrogation and isolation. Threats against family. Vague threats. 
Mysterious changes of treatment. 
I 
t  5.  Occasional Indulgences.  Provides positive motivation for  Occasional favours. Fluctuations of interrogators' attitudes. 
comliance. Hinders adjustment to  Promises. Rewards for partial compliance. Tantalising. 
deprivation. 
6.  Demonstrating  Suggests futility of resistance.  Confrontation. Pretending co-operation taken for granted. 
'Omnipotence'.  Demonstrating complete control over victim's fate. 
7.  Degradation.  Makes cost of resistance more  Personal hygiene prevented. Filthy infested surroundings. 
damaging to self esteem than  Demeaning punishments. Insults and taunts. Denial of privacy. 
capitulation. Reduces prisoner to 
'animal level' concerns. 
8.  Enforcing Trivial  Develops habit of compliance.  Forced writing. Enforcement of minute rules. 
Demands. 
Chart 10. Biderman's Chart of Coercion CHART 11: PRE-INTERROGATION TREATMENTS USED  ON 
DETAINEES 
1. General assault with truncheons and knuckledusters. Kicks to testicles and 
stomach. Faces slapped, ears drummed, arms twisted, chest hair pulled. Nose, 
chest,  mouth  and  throat  were  held.  During  these  attacks,  detainees  were 
alternatively threatened and bribed. 
2.  Men were forced to run barefoot over broken glass and stones whilst being 
beaten. 
3. Some men were dropped blindfold from helicopters hovering near  the ground. 
4.  Alsatian dogs were used to savage some of the men. 
5.  Torturous exercises were imposed - upto 48 hours for some men. 
6.  Men  were forced to stand against a wall for many hours with their legs 
akimbo. 
7. Detainees were repeatedly awakened as soon as they fell asleep. 
8.  Food and drink were withheld. 
9.  Bags were kept over the heads of some of the prisoners for up to six days. 
10. On  certain occasions an electric cattle prod was used. 
11. Some victims had their testicles manually compressed. 
12. Others were burned with matches and candles. 
13. Detainees were urinated upon. 
14. Injections of amphetamine drugs were given to some of the prisoners 
15. Psychological tortures were used such as:- Russian roulette; firing blanks; 
blindfolding; the use of stockings and surgical masks by the assailants; forcing 
men to stare at a white perforated wall In a small cubicle. 
49 CHART 12: TECHNIQUES USED BY THE BRITISH ARMY IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND TO MIMIC SENSORY DEPRIVATION 
1.  Prisoners were hooded before interrogation. 
2.  A sound machine was used to produce a constant hiss of ·white noise·. 
3.  Long periods of immobilization in the •stoika• position, i.e. being forced to 
lean against a  wall with legs wide apart standing on the toes, with only the 
fingertips touching the wall. Detainees who collapsed from exhaustion were 
beaten back into position. 
4.  Little or no food or drink. 
5.  Prisoners were forced to wear loose overalls several sizes too big. 
6. In addition these men were deprived of sleep for days on end. 
EFFECTS OF THESE PROCEDURES 
Although these processes were not technically the same as sensory deprivation, the 
purpose guiding their use was the deliberate production of related effects. 
Measures 1  ,2,3 and 5 cause visual, auditory, tactile and kinaesthetic deprivation and 
thus mimic sensory deprivation. Measures 1  ,4,  and 6,  deprive the brain of the sugar 
and oxygen necessary for normal functioning. Measures 1  ,4 and 6, may also disturb 
normal  body  metabolism.  Applied  together  in  conditions  of  high  physical  and 
psychological stress, they could effect rapid nervous breakdown. 
50 Georgia, otherwise known at the 'School of the Assassins' or 'La escuela del golpe' (the coup 
school).  it  has  been  accused  of  training  death  squads  in  Guatamala and  Honduras,  e.g. 
Batalion 3-16 (Walker,  1994).  In  1995,  the  Batimore Sun  obtained Freedom Of Information 
Act documents  on  Batallion 3-16, (which used electroshock and rubber suffocation devices 
on  prisoners  in  Honduras),  that  confirmed  that the  Unit  had  been  trained  in  interrogation 
techniques  by  the  CIA  (Baltimore  Sun,  11  June  1995).  Last  year,  further manuals were 
released  under  FOIA  on  Project  X,  part  of  the  US  Foreign  lntelliegence  Assistance 
Programme which  reveal  that until  the  1980's,  the  US  military  ran  an  intelligence training 
programme in Latin America and elsewhere, that taught foreign officers to offer bounties for 
captured or killed  insurgents,  spy  on  non-violent political  opponents,  kidnap  rebels' family 
members,  blackmail  unwanted  informants and  the  use  of drugs to facilitate  interrogation. 
Project X manuals were distributed by  the  US  Army  School of Americas but their use was 
stopped  only  in  1991  when  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  raised  ethical  and  legal 
questions. 
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Thus the creation of a bureaucracy practising systematic human rights violation will often 
include external 'liveware' e.g. the various foreign technical advisers, counter-insurgency and 
low intensity conflict strategists, paramilitary, intelligence and internal security police as well 
as the  'white collar mercenaries' who act  as  key  technical operators in  any  administrative 
policy of repression. This 'liveware' category includes all the people who are conditioned by 
fear or training  to  actually  put  into  practice  the  software  and  hardware  components of a 
particular policy of repression.
130 For the last decade, he export of such 'security' training has 
become a highly profitable commercial proposition (Gordon, 1987) and it is a characteristic 
of the  trade  in  torture  technology  and  expertise that it  has  become  so  intensly  privatised 
(Klare and Arnson,  1981 ).  Such technologies are now entering Europe from the USA. 
7.4 International Controls On The Export Of Electro-Shock & Stun Technology 
In  theory,  a substantial body of international human rights obligations should effectively 
prevent such transfers, including: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 5 of the African Charter on Human 
and People's Rights; Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 3 of the 
Europea:1  Convention for the  Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms;  UN 
Convention Against Torture; the UN  Basic Principles on  the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law  Enforcement  Officials  and  the  UN  Standard  Minimum  Rules  For  the  Treatment  of 
prisoners. Yet in January 1995, it was possible for a UK investigative reporter working for UK 
Channel 4 Dispatches, to obtain the enthusiastic willingness  of several British companies to 
supply such devices, which are in fact banned under UK law (Gregory 1995). 
7.5 The European Torture Trail 
Until the Channel 4 Programme, 'The Torture Trail' was shown,  it was not widely realized 
that  such  an  extensive  European  electro-shock  manufacturing  and  supply  base  existed. 
Undercover TV actors were given privileged access to a secret network of companies making 
electroshock weapons and  to come  away  with  orders worth over £3  million (consisting  of 
10,000 electroshock shields and 5000 shock batons from British Aerospace (BAe) and 15,000 
electroshock units from ICL Technical Plastics). But perhaps the insights this programme gave 
into the procurement and proliferation of electro-control technology is even more astonishing. 
Philip Morrris, the Sales Manager for Royal Ordnance, agreed to use the Royal Ordnance's 
worldwide procurement network to  bring the electroshock deal together, irrespective of the 
equipment's country of origin or its eventual destination; Ordnance would organise the whole 
package. Royal Ordnance's parent company, invited their clients to meet up at the secretive 
51 Covert Operation & Procurement Exhibition (COPEX), held at Sandown Park racecourse  in 
November 1994. A wide range of internal security was on  display.  Foreign invitees included 
delegations from China, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka 
and Turkey. 
The  Dispatches team  followed  through  that  rendezvous  with  a  meeting  at  the  Royal 
Ordnances own  offices in  Lancashire,  where  they  were  shown  a 40,000-volt shock  baton 
made  in  Eire,  together  with  an  electronic  riot  shield  made  in  Tennesee,  USA  by  Nova 
Technologies, which could immobilise 120 people without a battery change.  While the deal 
was  struck,  Royal  Ordnance  made  an  extraordinary  confession,  that they  had  sold  8000 
german electroshock batons as  part of the AI  Yamamah deal to  Saudi Arabia.
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A further insight into the complicity of companies involved in  this business was afforded 
by  the programme's  interview with the manager of ICL Technical Plastics in Glasgow, Frank 
Stott. 
132 He claimed that he used to sell shock batons to the apartheid regime in South Africa, 
and to Abu Dhabi for the Gulf States; and a year after the Tiananmen Square massacre, he 
sold electric-shock weapons to the Chinese authorities via  Hong, with the UK government's 
blessing,  and  said  that the trip was supported by  the  Department of Trade & Industry.  Mr. 
Stott  claimed  that  the  Chinese  had  an  ulterior  motive  for  buying  his  electro-shock 
weapons:they  wanted  to  copy  them.  (China  has  a  prodigious  electroshock  weapon 
manufacturing industry  (for example,  the  Tianjin  Bohai  Radio  Works manufactures 80,000 
shock instruments a year- all quality controlled(Fig.SO). It is instructive to note that one of the 
products photographed in  China for this programme, an extending electroshock probe (See 
Fig.51),  has been awarded a British patent (no.  GB214906A).
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7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
{i).  New regulations on the nature of  in-depth interrogation training should be agreed which 
prohibit export of such techniques to forces overseas known to be involved in gross human 
rights violation. 
(ii).  All  training  of foreign  military,  police,  security  and  intelligence forces  in  interrogation 
techniques, should be  subject to  licence, even if it is provided outside European territory . 
(iii).  Restrictions  on  visits  to  European  MSP  related  events  by  representatives  of  known 
torturing states should be effectively implemented. 
(iv) The Commission should be requested to achieve agreement between member States to: 
(a) immediately prohibit the transfer of all electroshock stun weapons to  any country 
where such weapons are likely to contribute to unlawful killings, or to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, for example by refusing any export licence where it 
is proposed that electroshock weapons will be transferred to a country where persistent 
torture or instances of instances of electric shock torture and ill treatment have been 
reported; 
b) introduce and implement new regulations on the manufacture, sale and transfer of 
all  electroshock weapons from  and into  Europe,  with  a full  report to the  European 
Parliament's Civil Liberties committee made each year. [Special consideration should 
be given to controlling the whole procurement process, covering even the making of 
contracts of sale, (to prevent a purchase deal made in a European country being met 
by a supplier or subsidiary outside of the EU,  in an effort to obviate extant controls)]. 
52 (c).  Ensure  that  the  proposed  regulations  should  cover  patents  and  prohibit  the 
patenting of any  device whose  sole  use  would  be  the  violation of human  rights,  via 
torture  or the  creation of unnecessary  suffering.  The  onus  should  be  on  the  patent 
seeker to  show that his patent would  not lead to  such  outcomes. 
(v)  The  European  Parliament  should  look  at  commissioning  new work to  investigate  how 
existing  legislation  within  member states  of the  EU,  can  be  brought to  bear to  prosecute 
companies who have been complicity in the supply of equipment used for torture as defined 
by  the  UN  convention  of torture.  This  new work  should  examine,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Directorate of  Human Rights:-
(a)  The  extent  to  which  such  technology  produced  by  European  companies  is  being 
transferred to human rights violators and the role played by international military, police 
and security fairs organised both  inside and outside European Borders; 
(b)  The possible measures that could be set in place to monitor and track any technology 
transfer within  this  category  and  any  potential  role  in  this  endeavour that  might be 
playe~ by  recognised  Non-Governmental Organisations. 
8.  REGULATION OF  HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION 
The last Gulf War was in  many ways an exception to the changing character of political 
conflict.  With the  end of the  Cold  War,  the future lies increasingly in  a bewildering array of 
separatist and counter-insurgency wars; border disputes; ethnic and religious violence; coups 
d'etat; national security and counter-revolutionary operations - what the military once called 
"low intensity conflicts" and  now call  "operations other than war." Civil conflicts in  Somalia, 
Kashmir,  Cambodia,  Sri  Lanka,  Rwanda,  the former Soviet Union,  the former Yugoslavia, 
South Korea and  most recently, Albania,  being cases in point. 
8.1  The  European Trade In  Repression 
Many of the major arms companies also have a paramilitary/internal security operation and 
diversification into these markets, is increasingly taking place. Weapons specifically designed 
to quell dissent are incredibly cheap compared to their major warfare cour.terparts like ships, 
aircraft and tanks, and have the market advantage of being used almost continuously against 
the enemy within. The move into a post-Cold War world has been accompanied by a change 
in  the  nature of warfare.  Military  scientists are on  the  threshold of dramatic weapons and 
technologies destined to transform internal political control. The clients most enthusiastically 
seeking this technology are the torturing states outlined in Figure 38. In those contexts we can 
accurately  describe  the  technology  of  political  control,  as  technology  of  repression  and 
identify exports of  these commodities as a repression trade.
1
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NGO's  like  Amnesty  International,  have  begun  to  catalogue  the  trade  in  specialised 
military, security and police technologies, to measure its impact on industrialising repression, 
globalising conflict, undermining democracy and strengthening the security forces of torturing 
states  to  create  a  new  generation  of  political  prisoners,  extra-judicial  killings  and 
'disappearances'. (Amnesty International, 1996). The key issue for Members of the European 
Parliament is how they will deal with the human and political fall out  of what is a systemic 
process of exporting repression: either importing a tidal wave of dispossessed refugees, or 
keeping  them in desperation at the borders of Europe.  In the longer term, it is important to 
53 examine the role and function of specific technologies in crushing dissent and to analyze the 
trade in repression and its correlates in terms of human displacement- huge numbers of non-
persons which some country must import. Such refugees will themselves become targets for 
further political control and exclusion in the newly moulded Fortress Europe, now well on the 
way  to  putting  whole  societies  under  surveillance,  in  an  effort  to  deny  them  permanent 
residence. The export of the technology of political control and the flow of refugees must be 
understood as  part of the same process. There is  an  urgent need for greater transparency 
and democratic control of such exports and a clearer recognition of their frequent linkage with 
gross human rights violations in  their recipient states. 
As discussed above, this arsenal of control includes area denial technologies such as razor 
wire to seal off selected zones, surveillance, telephone and fax tapping networks used to track 
dissidents; computerised communications, command and control systems linked to data banks 
and  remote  terminals(in  security  vehicles,  border  checkpoints  etc.);  automatic  vehicle 
recognition  and  tracking  equipment;  riot  technology  including  whips,  sawn-off  shotguns, 
incapacitating and less-lethal weapons, such as water cannon, stun grenades, multi-shot riot 
guns,  plastic bullets, chemical  irritants, injector weapons,  sound,  light and  electromagnetic 
zapping technologies; pre-fragmented exploding ammunition, dum-dum bullets, stroboscopic 
cameras which can  photograph every participant in a demonstration in seconds,; helicJpter 
mounted crowd  monitoring equipment;  public order vehicles;  identity recognition  systems; 
silenced  sub-machine  guns  and  assassination  rifles;  precision  laser  and  night  target 
acquisition aids;  prison and restraining technologies as well as blunt trauma inducing drugs 
and specially designed implements of torture. 
To many of the suppliers attending the specialised paramilitary, police and security fairs, 
the answer to the question would you sell your equipment to countries on the Redress Trust's 
map  of  the  torturing  states  (Fig.38),  would  be  a  resounding  'yes  please!'  In  fact  MSP 
technologies are aggressively marketed at a series of special fairs and exhibitions which take 
place all over the world(See Appendix 1.) Potential customers get an opportunity to  sample 
the latest wares(Fig.52) Weapons are sometimes on display that are banned for use in many 
European states.(Fig.53) and some clue is afforded to the dynamics behind proliferation and 
conversion of these technologies as European Fairs organisers target other continents such 
as Latin America.(Fig.54). Equipment on display at such fairs one month sometimes finds a 
ready application on the streets soon after.(Fig.55).  At Turkey's IDEF exhibition, European 
gas back packs were on display (Fig 56) as well as a flypast by the UK flying team the Red 
Arrows,  British  licencesd  production  internal  security  vehicles  were  exhibited  alongside 
Russian helicopter attack gunships.(Fig.57) 
In  the  wake  of growing  evidence  that  MSP  transfers from  the  European  Union  have 
contributed to the deliberate and indiscriminate killing of civilians, "disappearances", torture, 
and ill treatment on a mass scale, there is widespread public disquiet at the apparent inaction 
of the  governments  of  the  European  Union  to  address  this  concern. 
135  A few examples 
examining the  MSP transfers to  just two human  rights violating  countries are  sufficient to 
illustrate the nature of this trade.,i.e., European companies based in:- Austria
136
;  Belgium
137
; 
Denmark
138
; Finland
138
; France
140
; Germany
141
; Greece
142
; ltaly
143
;  Netherlands
1
""; Sweden
145
; 
&  the  UK
1411
;  exporting  MSP  supplies  to  Indonesia;  or  European  companies  based  in 
Belgium 
147
;  France 
148
;  Germany 
1411
;  Italy 
150
;  Netherlands 
151
;  and  the  UK
152
;  exporting  MSP 
goods to Turkey. 
Similarly, many companies in the  UK;  Belgium:  Switzerland; Germany; Austria;  Sweden 
and Finland are arranging licensed production through joint ventures with companies in third 
countries. For example: land Rover
153
; GKN Defence
154(UK); FN Nouvelle Herstai
155(Belgium); 
54 Heckler  &  Koch 156(Germany);  Steyr-Mannlicher
15\Austria);  FFV  Ordnance 
158(Sweden);PT 
Pindad
159(1ndonesia)  and  Pilatus
160(Switzerland).  These  arrangements  have  the  effect  of 
circumventing European or Member State strategic export controls. 
8.2  European Electroshock Weapon Exports 
Pierre Sane,  Secretary General of Amnesty International, speaking on 'The Torture Trail' 
called for all governments to investigate and to put in place new mechanisms, such as public 
disclosure in advance, to halt the trade in electroshock equipment which use it to torture.  In 
response to the disclosures on the programme the European Parliament made a resolution 
on  the  19  January  1995,  which  called  on  the  Commission to  bring  forward  proposals  to 
incorporate these  technologies  within  the  scope  of the  arms  export controls  and  ensure 
greater transparency in the export of all military, security and police technologies to  prevent 
the  hypocrisy  of  governments  who  themselves  breach  their  own  export  bans.(Doc 
EN\RE\26426447  4).
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The ineffectiveness of any action subsequently taken can be judged by  the fact that the 
same team of TV researchers returned to the torture trail  in 1996 and found it was very much 
business as usual. Despite the furore created by the first Dispatches Torture Trail programme, 
on their second expedition 'Back On The Torture Trail'  the undercover team found that of the 
eight British companies contacted only two were unwilling to quote for a new order of 300 
electroshock batons. The most enthusiastic companies featured in this programme were not 
put off by the fact that the intended destination was Zaire.  None of the companies featured 
bothered to check out the fake company's bona fides. In fact they were faxing their quotations 
to a public fax bureau machine at a railway station in Switzerland. Some of these companies 
said they could get around legal restrictions by transhipping them so that they would not enter 
the  UK and  seemed well  rehearsed  in  getting around European restrictions.  For example, 
SDMS's  chairman  said  that they  and  their South  African  associates  had  previously  sold 
electroshock  products  to  Libya,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone,  Angola,  Mexico,  Peru,  Burma  & 
Indonesia.  Another  company  offered  to  avoid  export  regulation  by  selling  Dispatches 
undercover research team, 300 shock batons made by the Macoisa company of Mexico City 
at a cost of $25,000.  Macoisa's boss,  Alfredo Aguilla,  told the undercover team  he  could 
export the 40,000 volt batons on behalf of his British client anywhere they chose. Aguilla told 
the programme's producer that bad human rights record were no problem.
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'Back  to  the  Torture  Trail'  marked  a  turning  point  in  human  rights  organisations 
understanding of the implications of loopholes in existing strategic exports controls legislation. 
Speaking in the programme, the Secretary Of Amnesty International, Pierre Sane said: "It is 
not just good enough to prohibit the manufacture of this equipment in the UK, or the sale or 
possession  of this  equipment in  the  UK.  Legislation  should  also  prohibit companies from 
engaging in offshore sale of this equipment(Gregory, 1996). 
8.3 Export Of Implements of Torture From The U.S.A. 
Sadly,  it no longer comes as a surprise to  discover that other leading Western Liberal 
Democracies have been colluding with the torture Trade. Yet during the 1980's some clues 
were  afforded  by  reports  that  US  companies  such  as Technipol  were  freely  advertising 
thumb  cuffs,  leg irons and  shackles (Klare & Arnson,  1981 ).  The  Danish Medical Group of 
Amnesty found that electronic prods manufactured by the US Shok-Baton Company had been 
used in the violation of human rights, 
163 and a repentant Uruguayan Torturer confessed that 
he had used US-made electroshock batons.(Cooper, 1984).
164 In fact scores of US companies 
either manufacture or supply electroshock devices, thumbcuffs and leg irons.
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55 Chart 13. Police torture exports licensed by 
US Commerce Department 1991-1993 
Police Torture Exports Licensed by Commerce Dept., 1991-1993 
I 
Recipient  noJvalue of licenses  noJv-.Jue of licenses  Recipient  noJvalue of licenses  noJvalue of licenses 
for cmdty. 0A82C'  for cmdty. OA84C
1  for cmdty. OA82C'  for cmdty. OA84C' 
.  .>,LBANIA  2151,240  LiECHTENSTEIN  1/ 55,250 
.-'\LGERIA  1/535  215370  LiTHUANIA  715453,593 
-'.NDORRA  1/537.500  71 5i 04,552  o'v\ACAO  3/54,619  4/ 53.220 
-'\~GENTINA  261 57,367,559  104/510,041,640  MAV.YSIA  315660,123  1615150,519 
-'\uSTRALIA  U>  51591,408  MALTA  1151 .ne 
-'.L.STRIA  11/ 5448,068  78." 53,996.467  MEXICO  33151,755,366  34/53,157,455 
3~HAMA5  3159,978  MONTSERRAT  1/51,710 
3 ~HIV\IN  1/51.527  MOZAMBIQUE  1/52.435 
3 ~NGLADESH  3/590  6151 5,704  NEPAL  21  5579 
3AR8AD05  8/513,224  THE  NETHERLANDS  (l)  1/53,232 
BELGIUM  (l)  4.  51,312,394  NETH.  ANTILLES  1/53,969  8/535,228 
BELIZE  1/55.037  81518,824  NEW CALEDONIA  11/530,021 
BENIN  1/51,371  NICARAGUA  14/5591,478 
BERMUDA  1/53,112  NIGERIA  31$2,428,710  61589,625 
~OLI"w;A  ').' 5655.845  25,  51,084.933  NO~WAY  1/5306  7/576,967 
BOTSWANA  3/57,255  OMAN  3/57,449  1/5467 
BRAZIL  ..;.a; 5252,334  PAKISTAN  2152.759,234  3 7/5 7,069,539 
BULGARIA  1  Of 5566,428  PANAMA  1  1  I 5 11 1  ,794  58/51,566,633 
CHILE  20/5260.908  40."51,208,813  PAPUA NEW GUINEA  5/533,313  10/$64,417 
(HINA  1/532,250  PARAGUAY  3/566,000  57/52,875,1 77 
COLOMBIA  21 565.500  I  B.' 5949,543  PERU  1/512,881  27152,300,885 
COSTA RICA  1215114.624  ?.-:-.·  5488,122  PHILIPPINES  1/$37,500  41/53.865,650 
(YPRUS  2/ s  1.10  4/$18,749  POV.ND  215659,332  715550,404 
CZECH  REPUBLIC  21547.090  71568,025  QATAR  1/549  4/5167,875 
DOMINICA  5/540,489  ROMANIA  61$130,128 
DOM.  REPUBLIC  61 5144.740  90.  51,070,584  RuSSIA  39/57,349,121 
ECUADOR  11/5)15.016  63.51.111,575  RWANDA  1/5404 
EGYPT  4/ s  1.190  4/58.041  SAUDI ARABIA  14/55,060.804  14/55,478,476 
tL SALVADOR  6.:.:.,· 5707.; 71  SEYCHE'.lES  1/579 
tSTONIA  7.' 51,704,997  SINGAPORE  71 55,589  25/ 5433,443 
FINLAND  5/522.:'14  52' S2,895.730  SLOVAKIA  1/5270,000 
FRANCE  (2)  4/588,237  SLOVENIA  1/58,934  1/5125,000 
FRENCH GUIANA  215120,000  SOUTH AFRICA  715837,991 
THE CAMBIA  2152,100  SPAIN  (1)  1/518,379 
GEORGIA  1/ 5210,500  SRII.ANKA  1/ 59.663 
GERMANY  (I)  3/542,925  SURINAM  71532.589 
CHANA  21522,200  12151,174,602  SwEDEN  4/$8,911  77159,419,883 
GRENADA  1/5726  SWITZERVIND  13/ $444,243  93/ 54,441 ,647 
CUATEMAVI  615170.:"71  55i S2,531 ,484  TAIWAN  1/$6,990 
GUINEA  1/$11.500  215195,201  T  .. NlANIA  21 52,005 
CL•'!'.~N"  9/59,750  lHAIVINO  315396,714  135!56,134,985 
HONDURAS  4/5121,588  TRINIDAD & TOBAGO  5/517,568  21/529.651 
HONG KONG  71 549.646  49/ s  1.265.271  TUNISIA  4/539,043 
HUNGARY  3/ 5358.500  12/51.159.371  TuRKEY  (2)  215154,000 
ICELAND  (I)  1/5540  UAE  21$21,062  14/$531,261 
INDONESIA  3/57,076  ~I 536,201  UGANDA  1/51,293 
IRAN  1/ 5219  UKRAINE  5/52,253,875 
IRELAND  15/$214,821  UNITED KINGDOM  (1)  5/550,387 
ISRAEL  21/5160.189  41/ 53,689,794  URUGUAY  31 S48,443  48/ s  1,449,694 
ITALY  (1)  215105,500  VENEZUELA  51151,609,012  220159,691,215 
)AMAICA  11/5110,151  ZAMBIA  "1/ 53,668 
)OR DAN  3/512,400  ~I 5329,300  ZIMBABWE  81520,988 
KENYA  1/ S2,9B8  TOTALS  365/ 527,638,035  208315117,270,285 
KOREA (SOUTH)  9/$362.666  10/5592,982 
KUWAIT  9/5785,283  1315767,114  Notes: (1 I  For explanation of the commodiry cat~gO<'ie1, see p. I. 
KAZAKHSTAN  24/ 53,831,270  !21  Australia. Japan. New Zealand and NATO members do not requ~re 
lATVIA  215304,082  validated  lic~nses to import commodiry Q.4.82C items. 
LEBANON  1/$28,140  2) 511,518  Sourc~  Oepartm~nt of Commera, per\Onal co~pond~ce, 
21  April  1995 lavailabl~ upon  ~uesl). 
56 Back in 1984, it emerged that US export regulations even had special customs codes form 
such items as 'specially designed instruments of torture' (US Department of Commerce, 1984) 
There was even  some  suggestion (in  para  376.14) that the  US  government could  distance 
itself from human rights violations through  'judiciou~ use of export controls'.(US Department 
of Commerce,  1983). Concerned by the possible scale of the trade in such technologies and 
the  possibility  they  could  be  exported  on  via  Europe  which  has  much  laxer  arms  export 
controls  and  transparency  than  the  US,  the  UK  human  rights  organisation,  the  Omega 
Foundation,  sought  comprehensive  US  export  trade  statistics.  A  Freedom  of  Information 
request was put down on  Omega's behalf by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 
What emerged was that the new category codes in the export administration regulations 
have if anything been extended to  include, inter alia: 
*  'saps,thumbcuffs,thumbscrews,  leg  irons,  shackles  and  handcuffs,  specially  designed 
implements of torture,  straight jackets etc.  (OA82C)' and 
*  'stun  guns,  shock  batons,  electric  cattle  prods  and  other immobilization  guns  (OA84C)' 
(United States Department of Commerce 1994). 
r 
The  statistics  of  the  export  licences  of  such  repressive  equipment  show  that  from 
September  1991  to  December  1993,  the  US  Commerce  Department  approved  over 350 
export licences under commodity category A82C.  The further category OA84C  aggregates 
together data on  electric shock batons with  shotguns and shells.  Over 2000 licences were 
granted from  September 1991  to December 1993. (See Chart 13) As feared, the list names 
many EU Member States including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany; Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. While the licenses represent a snapshot of 
permissions for the  sale  to  go  forward,  they  do  not indicate  actual  delivery,  nor are  they 
comprehensive  since  countries  in  NATO,  such  as  Turkey,  do  not require  a licence (Arms 
Sales Monitor, 1995). FAS has pointed out that aggregating data in this way, by lumping non-
controversial  data  on  equipment  such  as  those  on  helmets  with  controversial  data  on 
equipment often used for torture such as shock batons, effectively frustrates public oversight. 
Given the nature of some of the recipients - Saudi Arabia for example, where Amnesty has 
already  recorded  instances  of  Iraqis  being  tortured  with  electric  shock  batons  (Amnesty 
International,  1994),  many  observers feared  the  worst.
1
"  Pressure  to  desegregate  such 
categories  in  the  US  eventually  proved  successful  but  there  remains  a :ack  of  effective 
checking  and  some  items  which  should  be  in  the  amended  category,  are  still  slipping 
through 
167
. 
8. 4 Controlling The Spread of Push-Button Torture. 
Alarmed  by  new  information  emerging  on  the  extent of the  worldwide  trade  in  torture 
technologies, the International Secretariat of Amnesty launched a worldwide campaign against 
'Arming the Torturers, electroshock Torture and the Spread of Stun Technology, as this report 
was being finalized in March 1997 (Amnesty International 1997). Amnesty's report identified 
over 100 companies willing to supply modem stun weapons since 1990
1
", in twenty countries, 
including  members  of  the  EU,  (Belgium
188
,  France
170
,  Germany
171
,  Luxembourg
172
, 
Nethertands
173
,  Spain
174  and  the  United  Kingdom
175
).  The  proposals  made  by  Amnesty 
International to halt this trade in bush-button torture, have been incorporated into the policy 
recommendations below. 
57 8.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The  Commission  should  be  requested  to  achieve  agreement between  Member States  to 
undertake changes to  their respective strategic export controls so  that:-
(i)  All  proposed transfers of security or police equipment are publicly disclosed in advance, 
especially electroshock weapons, (including those arranged on European territory where tha 
equipment concerned  remains outside  Member States'  borders)  so  that the  human rights 
situation in  the intended receiving country can  be taken into consideration before any  such 
transfers are allowed.; 
(ii)  Reports are  issued on  the human rights situation in  receiving countries; 
(iii)  Member States Parliaments are notified of all  information necessary to  enable them  to 
exercise proper control over the implementation of the law,  including information on  human 
rights from non-governmental organisations; 
(iv)  Member  States  monitor  and  regulate  all  exhibitions  promoting  the  sale  of  security 
equipment  and  technology  to  ensure  that  any  proposed  transfers  such  as  electroshock 
weapons, will not contribute to unlawful killings,  or to torture or cruel,  inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; 
(v)  All  military,  police and security exhibitions are required to  publish  guest lists,  names of 
exhibitors, products and services on display and no visas or invitations should be issued to 
governments or representatives of security forces, known to carry out human rights violations. 
(vi)The  sender should  take  legal  responsibility for the  stated  use  of  military,  security  and 
police transfers in practice, for example making future contracts dependent on adherence to 
human rights criteria and that such criteria are central to the regulatory process. 
(vii)  The  European  Parliament  should  explore  the  possibilities  of  using  the  Joint  Action 
procedures used to establish the EU regulations on the export of Dual Use equipment to draw 
up common lists of (a) proscribed military, security, police (MSP)technology and training, the 
sole  or primary use  of which is to  contribute to  human rights violations;  (b)  sensitive MSP 
technologies  which  have  been  shown  in  the  past  to  be  used  to  commit  human  rights 
violations; and (iii) military, security and police units and forces which have been sufficiently 
responsible for human rights violations and to whom sensitive goods and services should not 
be  supplied. 
(vidi) The European Parliament should commission new research  into  the  extent to  which 
European companies are  complicity  in  supplying  MSP equipment used  to commit human 
rights violations and the prospects of instituting independent measures of monitoring the level 
and  extent  of  such  sales  whilst  tracking  their  subsequent  human  rights  impacts  and 
consequences. 
58 9.  CONCLUSIONS 
With  proper accountability and regulation,  some of the technologies discussed above do 
have  a legitimate  law  enforcement function;  without such  democratic control,  they  provide 
powerful  tools  of  oppression.  The  unchecked  vertical  and  horizontal  proliferation  of  the 
technologies  of political  control  described  in  this  report,  present  a powerful  threat  to  civil 
liberties  in  Europe  in  the  s  century,  particularly  if  the  political  context  of  freedoms  of 
expression changes in the next century, as many times as it has in the last. Whilst there are 
sufficient real  abuses of power by  the  police,  internal security  and  intelligence agencies to 
keep the conspiracy theorists busy for the foreseeable future, technological and decision drift 
will have an equal if not more powerful role to play if current trends develop unchecked. The 
real  threat  to  civil  liberties  and  human  rights  in  the  future,  is  as  likely  to  arise  from  an 
incremental erosion of civil  liberties,  than  it  is from  some  conscious plan.  The  rate  of such 
erosion is speeding up and is rapidly being fuelled by the pace of innovation in the technology 
of political  control.  An  arsenal  of  new  weapons  and  technologies  of  political  control  has 
already been developed or lies waiting on the horizon for a suitable opportunity to find useful 
work. 
As the globalisation of political control technologies increases, Members of the European 
Parliament have a right and  a responsibility  to  challenge the  costs,  as  well  as the  alleged 
benefits of so called advances in law enforcement. This report has sought to highlight some 
of the  areas which  are  leading  to  the  most undesirable  social and  political  consequences 
(such as advances in so called 'non-lethal weapons' or the emergence of a vast international 
machinery of communications supervision) and where a return to a fuller form of democratic 
control  is  seen  as  desirable.  The  social  and  political  implications  of  other  innovations 
mentioned above such as human recognition and tracking technologies, are under explored 
and further work should be undertaken.  In the meantime, urgent action is required by  other 
Directorates, to ensure European technology of political control does not get into the hands 
of tyrannical and repressive regimes, as it so often does today.  Members of the Committee 
are requested to  consider the policy recommendations provided  in  the  report as just a first 
step  to  help bring the technology of political control,  back under democratic control. 
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(4). & (6) deprive the brain of the sugar and oxgen necessary for normal functioning. Measures (1), (4). 
& (6) may disturb normal body metabolism. 
124. For a further account of the sensory deprivationtechniques used in Northern Ireland seethe British 
Medical Association, 1986.  Allegations of continued ill treatment of detainees in Northern Ireland have 
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BBC during the autumn of 1997. 
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136.Austria:Steyr-Mannlicher supplied  AUG 5.56mm assault rifles for service with the Indonesian Parachute and 
Counter-Terrorist police units (Military Powers 10/91). 
137.Belgium:FN Herstal supplied M49 sub machine guns,  FAL 7.62mm Assault Rifles,  Minimi  5.56mm light 
machine guns for police  and  security  force  use  (Military  10/91)  and  have  a representative  office  in  Jakarta 
(Defence Manufacturers Association ASEAN Report [DMA 8/90]). 
138.Denmarl<:Dansk lndustri Syndikat the Madsen sub-machine gun (made under licence by  IMBEL, 
Brazil) used by  Indonesian Police (DMA 8/90). 
139.Finland:Sako supplied Valmet rifles to  Security Forces (Jane's Security & Counter-Insurgency Equipment 
1990 [COIN 90]). 
140.  F  ranee :Acmat supplied wheeled armoured vehicles to the Indonesian Police (Military Powers 1  0/91): Creusot 
Loire supplied 205 AMX-13 tracked armoured vehicles (Military Powers 10/91); GIAT supplied 20 105mm LGI 
Mkll light guns  plus  a significant quantity of ammunition  (Jane's  Defence Weekly [JDW)  21/5/94);  Manurhin 
supplied SG540 SIG Assault Rifles (DMA 8/90); Morpho Systems supplied an Automated Fingerprint Recognition 
System (Milipol1993 Catalog): Panhard supplied 18 VBL Ught Amphibious Scout Cars (JDW 18/12196). 
141.Germany:Heckler & Koch supplied MP5 Sub machine guns used by  the Indonesian Special Forces and it 
was reported that the Indonesian Marines were to take delivery of MSG 90 Military Sniper Rifles (Asian Defence 
Journal11/95) and  police & security forces were already equipped with G3 Rifles (DMA 8/90). 
142.Greece: Pyrkal exported ammunition (Hellenic Defence Industries Catalog 96m 
143.1taly: Beretta Model12 Sub machine guns and BM-59 rifles used by police & security forces (Military Powers 
10/91) 
144.Netherlands:N\NM de Kruithoorn 20mm ammunition is  largely supplied by N\NM (DMA 8/90). 
145.Sweden:Bofors Indonesia's 40mm Bofors ammunition is obtained either from Sweden of Chartered Industries 
of Singapore  (DMA 8/90);  FFV  (Sweden)  sub-machine guns (produced  under  licence  in  Egypt)  supplied to 
Indonesia (COIN 90). 
69 146.UK:GKN Defence  10  AT-105  Saxon GKN Wheeled  armoured vehicles supplied to  the  Indonesian Police 
(Military  Powers  10/91):  Giover  Webb  Tactica  Water  Cannon.  "Bntain  fuels  Suharto  repression"  (Observer 
2117/96);  lnterarms Military  and  sporting  armaments  (FIS  93):  Land  Rover  Indonesia  purchased  1500  Land 
Rovers in  1979 which are popular and still in wide use,  including 10 for anti-riot duties and 2 for the Presidential 
Guard (DMA 8/90):  Amongst the  British military and  security e1uipment sold to Indonesia in  the last decade. 
was a prototype of Siemens Plessey Defence Systems GENERICs- the NATO command information system. 
GENERICs can display complex information about events unfolding across a landscape. It would enable the user 
to  concentrate forces efficiently in  response to demonstrations and  riots  (Independent 3/8/96 Technology that 
gives the edge to  'Big Brother') 
14  7. Belgium: Cockerill Mechnicallndustries $100 million subcontract to build armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles (AIFVs) for Turkish Army (JDW 9/9/89);  FN Herstal Minimi 5.56mm light mdchine gun used 
in Turkey (JDW 15/7/89). 
148.France: Euro Vectuer (GIAT)  has  set up a subsidiary  in  Turkey  [Savunna  Sanayii] to  oversee the  firms 
contract for 515 Dragor turrets (JDW 4/2/95); Thomson-CSF the TRS 22XX long range mobile (NATO Class 1) 
radar has been adopted by Turkey. Local company Tefken is co-producing 14 examples (International Defense 
Review [IDR] 9/96). 
149.Germany: Alcatel (Radio & Defense Systems)- Aselsan Electronics (Turkey) manufactures the Alcatel SEL 
RATAC-S Surveillance radar under licence (IDR 6/96); Heckler & Koch- Turkey manufactures H+K rifles and 
sub-machine guns  under licence  (American Academy  of Arts  &  Science 2194);  Thyssen Henschel Fox  NBC 
Reconnaissance vehicles supplied to Turkey (JDW 2111/91 ). 
150.1taly: Agusta SpA $19 million contract to  supply Turkish Ministry of Defence with 20 AB-206B Jet Ranger 
Helicopters. 
151. Netherlands: OAF has received a $50 million subcontract to provide weapon station and vehicle integration. 
The  first  20  AIFVs  will  be  assembled  by  OAF  after  which  assembly  will  begin  in  Turkey  (JDW 9/9/89); 
Eurometaal - Eurometaal USA listed  as  exporting  several shipments of grenades to Turkey  (PIERS  12195), 
Turkey will begin production of cluster bombs as  part of a joint venture between MCIA (Turkey) & Eurometaal. 
Under the ten year agreement 206,000 cluster bombs will be produced for Turkey and 103,000 for Holland (Arms 
Trade News 21/1/94). 
152.UK: Burle Ltd  listed as exporting CCTV equipment (FIS Turkey 94); Chemring Ltd 32,355 complete round 
flare  bombs  and  IR  Decoy  and  Chaff-S  Ammunition  (Turkey  Contracts  Bulletin  1/95);  GEC  Marconi 
Communication Systems resolved dispute with the Turkish Armed Forces regarding the contract for the Scimitar 
H (HF-SSB) radios as part of a £96 million contract started in 1990 (JDW 4/2195); GEC Marconi Secure Systems 
crypto devices and  spare parts  (Turkey  Contracts Bulletin  2195);  Pilatus Britten  Norman sold  a Multi  Sensor 
Surveillance Aircraft (MSSA) to Turkey  for Border Surveillance for  an  undisclosed  amount (Aerospace  Daily 
16/6/93);  Racal  Comsec Ltd  - CLASSIC  {Covert Local  Area  Sensor  System for Intruder Classification)  w2s 
originally developed to detect illegal immigrants attempting to enter Hong Kong. A total of 1700 systems have 
been ordered by  31  countries, of which 10 are NATO members Oncluding Canada, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) 
(lOR 6/96);  Short Brothers - recent customers for the Shorts Shorland vehicles include 40 APCs (Armoured 
Personnel  Carriers)  to  the  Turkish  Ministry  of Interior to  be  used  by  the  Gendarmerie;  Transac  supplied 
'armoured vehicles' (FIS Turkey 94). 
153.Land Rover (UK) have a licence production agreement with Otobus Karoseri (Otokar) of Turkey. Since 1987, 
Otokar has built Land Rover 4x4 vehicles under licence with production running at approx 2500 vehicles a year. 
The Scorpion has an  all welded steel hull with around 70°,.{,  of the automobile components drawn from the well 
known Land Rover Defender 90/100 (4x4).  Machine gun,  night vision and day vision equipment are standard 
(JDW 6/B/94).  Export  licence  control  is  not  exercised  as  the  UK  Government  classifies  the  Land  Rover 
components as civilian spare  parts.  This is despite the end product being  a highly  manuoverable and  lethal 
internal securrty vehicle.  Additional reports have shown how this type of third country licenced production have 
allowed MSP transfers that would not be permitted direct from the UK. It was reported in 1995 that Otokar had 
obtained  a  $200  million  deal to  supply  700  Scorpion vehicles to  Algeria  (Defense  News 26/6/95).  The  UK 
currently has a military embargo on  Algeria. 
70 154.GKN Defence (UK):  produce Mowag (Switzerland)  armoured  and internal security vehicles under licence. 
Also produced in  Chile  and  Canada  (Armada International 4-5/96). Oman has  received the first batch  of GKN 
Defence  built  MOWAG  Piranha  8x8  vehicles.  (JDW 16/9/95).  GKN  Defence  have  also  established  licenced 
production of its vehicles in the Philippines.The first 7 Simba 4x4 APCs have been  delivered to the Philippines 
Armed Forces. 150 vehicles have been ordered fitted with a 12. ?mm Browning MG  armed turret. Eight Simbas 
will supplied from the  UK,  several as  kits  and the  rest.assembled at the Subic Bay plant operated  by the joint 
venture  Asian  Armoured  Vehicle Technologies Corp.  A number of variants will  probably  be  developed.(JDW 
30/4/94). It was reported in1989 that the  Philippines is therefore set to  become the first ASEAN nation with  an 
armoured vehicle manufacturing capability and  could act  as  a base for regional export sales.  (JDW 16/12/89). 
155.FN Nouvelle Herstal SA (Belgium)  is helping to build an ammunition producting factory in  Eldoret, 
Kenya  and is  providing  much  of the  machinery.  It  is  estimated  that the  factory  has  cost between 
£6-170 million, but the Kenyan Government refuses to discuss the financing arrangements. The factory 
will be capable of producing 20 million bullets a year.  (Guardian 20/6/96). 
156.Heckler and  Koch  (Germany). H+K small arms are  produced  under licence in  many  countries throughout 
the world. MKE MP5 A3 and MP5 K Sub machine guns for 9mm Parabellum ammunition are produced by MKE 
under licence from Heckler and Koch  (Germany). Are very similiar in  almost all aspects to the original Heckler 
& Koch version.(Police & Security Equipment 9617).  In 1994, the American Academy of Arts & Science reported 
that H+K  rifles  'Nere  produced  under  licence  in  the  following  countries:  France,  Greece,  Norway,  Portugal, 
Sweden,Turkey,UK,  Mexico,  Burma,  Iran,  Pakistan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Thailand.  H+K  Sub-machine  guns  were 
produced  under  licence  in:  Greece  , Portugal,  Turkey,  UK.  Iran,  Saudi  Arabia.(AAAS  2/94).  Such  licenced 
production can mean in practice that Heckler & Koch small arms are transferred to countries that the European 
Union may have export restrictions on.  For example it was reported that in "late 1991, 50,000 Heckler & Koch 
G3automatic rifles were also supplied to  Sudan,  probably via  Iran." JDW 9/5/92, 
157.Steyr-Mannlicher (Austria)  First batch  of 1000 STEYR 5.56mm AUG  Assault rifles for Malaysian Armed 
forces completed by  SME Tools in Malaysia (Total of 65,000 rifles are to be produced over 5 year period) (JDW 
5/10/91 
158 .. FFV Ordnance (Sweden)  9mm Model 45 sub machine gun - generally known  as the Carl Gustaf. Made 
under licence in Port Said, Egypt. A silenced version was used by  US special forces in S.E Asia. The weapon 
was also copied & produced in  Indonesia -currently not in  production. (COIN 90). 
159.PT Pindad  (Persero)  (Indonesia)  PT Pindad  has  signed  a  licence agreement with  Chartered 
Industries  of  Singapore  to  produce  the  CIS  40-AGL  40mm  automatic  grenade  launcher.  (JDW 
28/5/94). Also reported as producing the following small arms under licence production agreements: 
version of FNC rifle  as SS1-V1  and  SS1-v2, version of Browning High Power pistol - made under 
licence from  FN,  Belgium; version of Beretta 9mm Model SMG - made under licence from Beretta, 
USA;  60mm Mortar- made  under licence from Tampella,  Finland;  81  mm Mortar (Quantity 500)  -
(Tampella, Finland);  Model 38/49 SMG and Model 12 SMG- made under licence from Beretta, USA; 
Model 45 (Carl Gustav) SMG - made under licence from Sweden; FNC, FN FAL, FN MAG FN Mauser 
98 carbine (used by police)- made under licence from FN,  Belgium; FN  Minimi SAW- made under 
licence from FN,  Belgium.  (Defence Manufacturers Association 8/90:  Indonesia - Police &  Security 
Equipment Holdings). 
160.1t was reported in 1994 that the Swiss company, Pi latus Flugzeugwerke opened a military trainer production 
line at  its  UK  subsidiary  on the Isle of \Mght,  called Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd  (UK), to side step tough  new 
arms-export regulations.(Fiight International 6/4/94). One reason suggested for the move was that the Swiss 
aircraft company wanted to take advantage of laxer British rules on arms exports. Pilatus Aircraft, a subsidiary 
of Oerlikon-Buhrle, currently manufactures the PC-7 and PC-9 in Stans, near Lucerne.  The planes,  originally 
developed for training, have been widely sold to countries such as Guatemala, Burma, Iraq, Iran and El Salvador. 
Swiss law prohibits military sales to  'areas of conflict'.  Pilatus has long claimed that its planes are not military 
equipment and that, if armies buy them for training, that is not the same as buying them for killing. At least one 
company in Belgium openly offers gun ready conversion services. (Observer 27/3/94). The UK subsidiary already 
has  a licenced  production  agreement with  the  Philippines,  the  PADC  (Philippines Aerospace  Development 
Corporation) was reported to be building the Islander light transport and passenger aircraft. The Islander has A 
STOL capability  and  can  be used for  cargo,  passenger, survey,  aerial spraying  and  in  its Martime Defender 
version, maritime surveillance operations. The original agreement called for the transfer of 105 Islanders to the 
71 PADC. The first 6 were built by  Britten-Norman and :;old by PADC. The next 14 were delivered unfinished, and 
the next 35 were assembled by  PADC. After Britten-Norman was acquired by  Swiss firm,  Pilatus,  in  1979. The 
assembling licence was suspended. But in Marhc 1980 a new agreement was reached for the assembly of 12 
more Islanders, including one turboprop BN-2T Turbine Islander. In 1981, PADC were no longer just assembling 
the Islander but building it from the ground up.  PADC hoped to  become the exclusive distributer of the Pilatus. 
Products in the ASEAN region.(Arms Production  1984). 
161. The  full text of resolution Doc EMRE\264264474 read: 
- aware of the European Parliament's concerns regarding the export of repressive technologies to  repressive 
reginmes that violate human rights,  . 
- clsturbed  at recent revelations that such technologies are being produced in at least three European Union 
(EU) countries, namely Germany, Ireland and  the United Kingdom, companies such as Equipol, France Selection 
Neral et Cie  (France)  Tactical Arms International UK and British Aerospace are  all known to have  suppli~d 
electroshock units, 
- horrified  at the information that these technologies have been exported amongst others to Saudi Arabia, China, 
the Gulf States and South Africa under the Apartheid regime, 
- aware  that  these technologies have been used in gross violation of human rights, 
aware of  government complicity in  these transactions that have been formally banned by the  governments 
concerned,  for example ICL  Technical Plastics in  Glasgow,  which produces electroshock weapo11s 
1.  R~ests  a statement from the governments concerned regarclng the allegations; 
2.  Urges support for Amnesty lntemationars can for a fuR investigation into the extent of the trade in the EU; 
3.  Calls on the  Commission to bring forward proposals to  incorporate those technologies within the scope of 
arms export controls and ensure greater transparency in the export of  all military security and  police technologies 
to prevent the hypocrisy of governments who themselves breach their own export bans; 
4.  Instructs the President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the EU Member State 
Governments. 
162. For further details, see Ballantyne,  1996. 
163. Amnesty International Danish Medical Group,  1987. 
164. The image used in  Fig.46 was taken by this man and supplied to Amnesty International. 
165.For example AB Electronics (electronic restraint devices); AFY Distributors (electroshock batons);Amazing 
Concepts (Intimidator electric shock weapons),; Armas No Mortales (electroshock weapons); B.West Imports 
(paralyser  Stun  Batons);  Custom  Armouring  Corp  (Nova  Electronic  riot  equipment);  Federal  Laboratories 
Division(Eiectronic batons); Hiatt Thompson (restraint devices); Nova Technologies (electronic restraint and stun 
devices); Paralyzer Protection (electric shock stunguns and batons); Ranger Joes (stun guns); Reliapon Police 
Producst (Nova  Electronic restraints  and  shields);  S.  & J.  Products (electronic restraint devices);  SAS  R&D 
Services (electronic batons); Sherwood Communications Associates LtD( Equaliser and Ughtning stun guns); 
Stun Tech Inc (Electronic immobilisation weapons and the REACT belts); Taser Industries (electronic dart shock 
weapons); The Edge Company (Thunderbolt stun gun); AMerican Handcuff Co., (leg irons); C&S Security (gang 
transport chains); Smith & Wesson (belly chains and other restraining equipment); Technipollnternational (leg 
irons and thumbcuffs); Tobin Tool and Die (shackles); WS Darley (leg irons and  belly chains) -to name but a 
few companies who have advertised their wares. [This information has been collected from compny brochures, 
Police & Security News (various volumes) and Thomas Register (1992). 
166.Confirmation of these fears was provided by a secret list of licenses issued by the Commerce Department 
over the last decade that was obtained by the US magazine 'Counterpunch, (October 1, 1995), that was not made 
available to FAS. It cited Air Parts International's export to yemen of shock batons with high voltage; Creative 
Security's export of shock batons to Saudi Arabia; Jonas Aircraft and  Arms export of saps - (lead bludgeons 
covered with leather) to Egypt and shock batons to Saudi Arabia in 1992; Nova Technologies export of electronic 
stun guns to the Phillipines; Premier Crown Corporation's export of twenty six inch shock batons with hot centre 
to Saudi Arabia; Smith and Wesson's export of shock batons and mace batons to both Saudi Arabia & Yemen; 
Transtechnology Corporation's export of riot shields with Arabic inscription to Yemen;  and Tri County Police 
Supplies export of shock batons to Thailand. 
72 167.  On  November  13.  1995,  The  US  Secretary  of Commerce  informed  the  speaker  oi the  House.  Newt 
Gingrich that he  had  disaggregated these items to  form a new ECCN.  OA83D on  the Commerce Control List. 
Commerce also added a new section to the Export Administration Regulations. Section 776.19. "Implements of 
Torture" to further seggregate these items. (Brown. 1995). Y  clt even after this review took place. it was disclosed 
that the US government had approved the sale ofthumcuffs to Russia,; blackjacks, stun guns and shock batons 
to Lithuania, Moldova. Panama and Tanzania; and electronic riot shields and batons to Mexico.(Lelyveld, 1996) 
168.Amnesty is careful to  point out in  its reports that it  is  not making  any  accusation against any  company of 
direct complicity in torture but that these companies have offfered to supply since 1990. It is not a definitive list 
because  of the  difficulty  in  obtaining  data  on  the  subject  in  many  countries  and  because  of the  inevitable 
business and market changes. 
169.The  Belgium  companies  are  thought  to  be  Belgium  Business  lnternationai(BBI),  Browning  and  Falcon 
Security & telecommunivations. In June 1996, De Morgen newspaer quoted a BBI salesman, 'We work via other 
countries like Spain or no .. the easiest is Paris. But if you have your own transitoire [middleman] we just deliver 
to them  .. We have several models. The most useful is no bigger than two packs of cigarettes and gives shocks 
of 150,000 volts. The problem with this type of weapon is that you have to stretch your arm to come  into contact 
with the enemy. Thats why I advise the mattracks[truncheons] with two electrodes at the end -ideal for riot police 
or presidential guards.  Even  last year,  the  central AFrican Presidential Guards were equipped with this. Yes 
Belgium is rather strict, but Africa and Latin America permit us to just export it to a middle man and then we have 
it depart from there.' 
170.  The French companies are thought to be  Auto F;  Doursoux -Securitec s.a.r.l; Equipol; France Selection: 
GK Productions; Glam Securite; Le  Protecteur; Nieral & Cie  Sari and SAE Alsetex (See Fig53) 
171.The German  companies  are  thought to  be  Bonowi;  Electron-Import & Export;  Enforcer (Pulz  & Charbit) 
GmbH;  M.S.C; M.T.S.; M.V.S.;NOWAR Security  Equipment GmbH;  Otto Boenicke; PK Electronic;  Rennhak 
Nachtsichtsysteme; Sicherheitstechnik Schmid (STS); Sipe Electronic GmbH; Solid Company Sicherheitstechnik 
Import & Export; TEWl Textil \Mghardt; Tradimex Vertriebs GmbH; Waffenhandel Uwe Ulriche; Wapo Electronic 
GmbH. 
172.The company refered to is thought to be Alpra Safety which advertised such products in 1993 but is thought 
to be no longer trading. 
173.The company referred to is thought to be  Reinaert Electronics. 
174. the company referred to is thought to be NitSpy Defensa Y contraespionaje. 
175.The companies referred to were largely uncovered by the Channel 4 Dispatches programmes. referred to 
in the text.(Gregory 1995, 1996) They include British Aerospace Defence Ltd (Royal Ordnance Division); CCS 
Communication, Control Inc; Compass Safety International; ICL  Technical Plastics LtD; International Procurement 
Services; J & S Franklin LtD;  PK Electronic International LtD; SDMS Security Products LtD. 
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